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Abstract
In this work, an explicit scheme of wiretap coding based on polar lattices is proposed to achieve the secrecy
capacity of the additive white Gaussian noise (AWGN) wiretap channel. Firstly, polar lattices are used to construct
secrecy-good lattices for the mod-Λs Gaussian wiretap channel. Then we propose an explicit shaping scheme to
remove this mod-Λs front end and extend polar lattices to the genuine Gaussian wiretap channel. The shaping
technique is based on the lattice Gaussian distribution, which leads to a binary asymmetric channel at each level
for the multilevel lattice codes. By employing the asymmetric polar coding technique, we construct an AWGN-good
lattice and a secrecy-good lattice with optimal shaping simultaneously. As a result, the encoding complexity for
the sender and the decoding complexity for the legitimate receiver are both O(N logN log(logN)). The proposed
scheme is proven to be semantically secure.
I. INTRODUCTION
Wyner [1] introduced the wiretap channel model and showed that both reliability and confidentiality could be
attained by coding without any key bits if the channel between the sender and the eavesdropper (wiretapper’s channel
W ) is degraded with respect to the channel between the sender and the legitimate receiver (main channel V ). The
goal of wiretap coding is to design a coding scheme that makes it possible to communicate both reliably and securely
between the sender and the legitimate receiver. Reliability is measured by the decoding error probability for the
legitimate user, namely lim
N→∞
Pr{M̂ 6= M} = 0, where N is the length of transmitted codeword,M is the confidential
message and M̂ is its estimate. Secrecy is measured by the mutual information between M and the signal received
by the eavesdropper Z[N ]. In this work, we will follow the strong secrecy condition proposed by Csisza´r [2], i.e.,
lim
N→∞
I(M;Z[N ]) = 0, which is more widely accepted than the weak secrecy criterion lim
N→∞
1
N I(M;Z
[N ]) = 0. In
simple terms, the secrecy capacity is defined as the maximum achievable rate under both the reliability and strong
secrecy conditions. When W and V are both symmetric, and W is degraded with respect to V , the secrecy capacity
is given by C(V )− C(W ) [3], where C(·) denotes the channel capacity.
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2In the study of strong secrecy, plaintext messages are often assumed to be random and uniformly distributed.
From a cryptographic point of view, it is crucial that the security does not rely on the distribution of the message.
This issue can be resolved by using the standard notion of semantic security [4] which means that, asymptotically,
it is impossible to estimate any function of the message better than to guess it without accessing Z[N ] at all. The
relation between strong secrecy and semantic security was recently revealed in [5], [6], namely, semantic security
is equivalent to achieving strong secrecy for all distributions pM of the plaintext messages:
lim
N→∞
max
pM
I(M;Z[N ]) = 0. (1)
Alice Encoder AWGN 
AWGN 
Decoder 
Eve 
Bob 
Fig. 1. The Gaussian wiretap channel.
In this work, we construct lattice codes for the Gaussian wiretap channel (GWC) which is shown in Fig. 1. The
confidential message M drawn from the message set M is encoded by the sender (Alice) into an N -dimensional
codeword X[N ]. The outputs Y[N ] and Z[N ] received by the legitimate receiver (Bob) and the eavesdropper (Eve)
are respectively given by 
Y
[N ] = X[N ] +W
[N ]
b
Z
[N ] = X[N ] +W[N ]e ,
where W
[N ]
b and W
[N ]
e are N -dimensional Gaussian noise vectors with zero mean and variance σ2b , σ
2
e respectively.
The channel input X[N ] satisfies the power constraint Ps, i.e.,
1
N
E[‖X[N ]‖2] ≤ Ps.
Polar codes [7] have shown their great potential in solving the wiretap coding problem. The polar coding scheme
proposed in [8], combined with the block Markov coding technique [9], was proved to achieve the strong secrecy
capacity when W and V are both binary-input symmetric channels, and W is degraded with respect to V . More
recently, polar wiretap coding has been extended to general wiretap channels (not necessarily degraded or symmetric)
in [10] and [11]. For continuous channels such as the GWC, there also has been notable progress in wiretap lattice
coding. On the theoretical aspect, the existence of lattice codes achieving the secrecy capacity to within 12 nat under
the strong secrecy as well as semantic security criterion was demonstrated in [6]. On the practical aspect, wiretap
lattice codes were proposed in [12] and [13] to maximize the eavesdropper’s decoding error probability.
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3A. Our contribution
Polar lattices, the counterpart of polar codes in the Euclidean space, have already been proved to be additive
white Gaussian noise (AWGN)-good [14] and further to achieve the AWGN channel capacity with lattice Gaussian
shaping [15]1. Motivated by [8], we will propose polar lattices to achieve both strong secrecy and reliability over
the mod-Λs GWC. Conceptually, this polar lattice structure can be regarded as a secrecy-good lattice Λe nested
within an AWGN-good lattice Λb (Λe ⊂ Λb). Further, we will propose a Gaussian shaping scheme over Λb and Λe,
using the multilevel asymmetric polar coding technique. As a result, we will accomplish the design of an explicit
lattice coding scheme which achieves the secrecy capacity of the GWC with semantic security.
• The first technical contribution of this paper is the explicit construction of secrecy-good polar lattices for the
mod-Λs GWC and the proof of their secrecy capacity-achieving. This is an extension of the binary symmetric
wiretap coding [8] to the multilevel coding scenario, and can also be considered as the construction of secrecy-
good polar lattices for the GWC without the power constraint. The construction for the mod-Λs GWC provides
considerable insight into wiretap coding for the genuine GWC, without deviating to the technicality of Gaussian
shaping. This work is also of independent interest to other problems of information theoretic security, e.g.,
secret key generation from Gaussian sources [19].
• Our second contribution is the Gaussian shaping applied to the secrecy-good polar lattice, which follows the
technique of [6], [15]. The resultant coding scheme is proved to achieve the secrecy capacity of the GWC.
It is worth mentioning that our proposed coding scheme is not only a practical implementation of the secure
random lattice coding in [6], but also an improvement in the sense that we successfully remove the constant
1
2 -nat gap to the secrecy capacity
2.
B. Comparison with the extractor-based approach
Invertible randomness extractors were introduced into wiretap coding in [5], [20], [21]. The key idea is that
an extractor is used to convert a capacity-achieving code with rate close to C(V ) for the main channel into a
wiretap code with the rate close to C(V )− C(W ). Later, this coding scheme was extended to the GWC in [22].
Besides, channel resolvability [23] was proposed as a tool for wiretap codes. An interesting connection between
the resolvability and the extractor was revealed in [24].
The proposed approach and the one based on invertible extractors have their respective advantages. The extractor-
based approach is modular, i.e., the error-correction code and extractor are realized separately; it is possible to harness
the results of invertible extractors in literature. The advantage of our lattice-based scheme is that the wiretap code
designed for Eve is nested within the capacity-achieving code designed for Bob, which represents an integrated
approach. More importantly, lattice codes are attractive for emerging applications in network information theory
1Please refer to [16]–[18] for other methods of achieving the AWGN channel capacity.
2The 1
2
-nat gap in [6] was due to a requirement on the volume-to-noise ratio of the secrecy-good lattice. In this paper, we employ mutual
information, rather than via the flatness factor, to directly bound information leakage, thereby removing that requirement of the secrecy-good
lattice.
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4thanks to their useful structures [16], [25]; thus the proposed scheme may fit better with this landscape when
security is a concern [26].
C. Outline of the paper
The paper is organized as follows: Section II presents some preliminaries of lattice codes. The binary polar codes
and multilevel lattice structure [27] are briefly reviewed in Section III, where the original polar wiretap coding
scheme in [8] is slightly modified to be compatible to the following shaping operation. In Section IV, we construct
secrecy-good polar lattices for the mod-Λs GWC. In Section V, we show how to implement the discrete Gaussian
shaping over the polar lattice to remove the mod-Λs front end, using the polar coding technique for asymmetric
channels. Then we prove that our wiretap lattice coding achieves the secrecy capacity with shaping. Finally, we
discuss the relationship between the lattice constructions with and without shaping in Section VI.
D. Notation
All random variables (RVs) will be denoted by capital letters. Let PX denote the probability distribution of a RV
X taking values x in a set X and let H(X) denote its entropy. For multilevel coding, we denote by Xℓ a RV X
at level ℓ. The i-th realization of Xℓ is denoted by x
i
ℓ. We also use the notation x
i:j
ℓ as a shorthand for a vector
(xiℓ, ..., x
j
ℓ), which is a realization of RVs X
i:j
ℓ = (X
i
ℓ, ...,X
j
ℓ). Similarly, x
i
ℓ:j will denote the realization of the
i-th RVs from level ℓ to level j, i.e., of Xiℓ:j = (X
i
ℓ, ...,X
i
j). For a set I, Ic denotes its compliment set, and |I|
represents its cardinality. For an integer N , [N ] will be used to denote the set of all integers from 1 to N . A binary
memoryless asymmetric (BMA) channel and a binary memoryless symmetric (BMS) channel will be denoted by
W and W˜ , respectively. Following the notation of [7], we denote N independent uses of channel W by WN . By
channel combining and splitting, we get the combined channel WN and the i-th subchannel W
(i)
N . Specifically, for
a channel Wℓ at level ℓ, W
N
ℓ , Wℓ,N and W
(i,N)
ℓ are used to denote its N independent expansion, the combined
channel and the i-th subchannel after polarization. An indicator function is represented by 1(·). Throughout this
paper, we use the binary logarithm, denoted by log, and information is measured in bits.
II. PRELIMINARIES OF LATTICE CODES
A. Definitions
A lattice is a discrete subgroup of Rn which can be described by
Λ = {λ = Bx : x ∈ Zn},
where B is an n-by-n lattice generator matrix and we always assume that it has full rank in this paper.
For a vector x ∈ Rn, the nearest-neighbor quantizer associated with Λ is QΛ(x) = argmin
λ∈Λ
‖λ−x‖. We define the
modulo lattice operation by x mod Λ , x−QΛ(x). The Voronoi region of Λ, defined by V(Λ) = {x : QΛ(x) = 0},
specifies the nearest-neighbor decoding region. The Voronoi cell is one example of fundamental region of the
lattice. A measurable set R(Λ) ⊂ Rn is a fundamental region of the lattice Λ if ∪λ∈Λ(R(Λ) + λ) = Rn and if
June 13, 2018 DRAFT
5(R(Λ) + λ) ∩ (R(Λ) + λ′) has measure 0 for any λ 6= λ′ in Λ. The volume of a fundamental region is equal to
that of the Voronoi region V(Λ), which is given by Vol(Λ) = |det(B)|.
The theta series of Λ (see, e.g., [28, p.70]) is defined as
ΘΛ(τ) =
∑
λ∈Λ
e−πτ‖λ‖
2
, τ > 0.
In this paper, the reliability condition for Bob is measured by the block error probability Pe(Λ, σ
2) of lattice
decoding. It is the probability Pr{x /∈ V(Λ)} that an n-dimensional independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.)
Gaussian noise vector x with zero mean and variance σ2 per dimension falls outside the Voronoi region V(Λ). For
an n-dimensional lattice Λ, define the volume-to-noise ratio (VNR) of Λ by
γΛ(σ) ,
Vol(Λ)
2
n
σ2
.
Then we introduce the notion of lattices which are good for the AWGN channel without power constraint.
Definition 1 (AWGN-good lattices): A sequence of lattices Λb of increasing dimension n is AWGN-good if, for
any fixed Pe(Λb, σ
2) ∈ (0, 1), limn→∞ γΛb(σ) = 2πe, and if, for any fixed VNR greater than 2πe,
lim
n→∞Pe(Λb, σ
2) = 0.
It is worth mentioning here that we do not insist on exponentially vanishing error probabilities, unlike Poltyrev’s
original treatment of good lattices for coding over the AWGN channel [29]. This is because a sub-exponential or
polynomial decay of the error probability is often good enough.
Next, we introduce the notion of secrecy-good lattices. For this purpose, we need the capacity C(Λe, σ
2) of the
mod-Λe channel, which will be defined in (9).
Definition 2 (Secrecy-good lattices): A sequence of lattices Λe of increasing dimension n is secrecy-good if, for
any fixed VNR of Λe smaller than 2πe, the channel capacity C(Λe, σ
2) vanishes:
lim
n→∞C(Λe, σ
2) = 0.
Note that this definition is different from that in [6], which is based on the flatness factor associated with the
lattice Gaussian distribution. We will show that this definition is also sufficient to guarantee vanishing information
leakage (see Remark 3).
B. Flatness factor and lattice Gaussian distribution
For σ > 0 and c ∈ Rn, the Gaussian distribution of mean c and variance σ2 is defined as
fσ,c(x) =
1
(
√
2πσ)n
e−
‖x−c‖2
2σ2 ,
for all x ∈ Rn. For convenience, let fσ(x) = fσ,0(x).
Given lattice Λ, we define the Λ-periodic function
fσ,Λ(x) =
∑
λ∈Λ
fσ,λ(x) =
1
(
√
2πσ)n
∑
λ∈Λ
e−
‖x−λ‖2
2σ2 ,
for x ∈ Rn.
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6The flatness factor is defined for a lattice Λ as [6]
ǫΛ(σ) , max
x∈R(Λ)
|Vol(Λ)fσ,Λ(x)− 1| .
It can be interpreted as the maximum variation of fσ,Λ(x) from the uniform distribution over R(Λ). The flatness
factor can be calculated using the theta series [6]:
ǫΛ(σ) =
(
γΛ(σ)
2π
)n
2
ΘΛ
(
1
2πσ2
)
− 1.
We define the discrete Gaussian distribution over Λ centered at c ∈ Rn as the following discrete distribution
taking values in λ ∈ Λ:
DΛ,σ,c(λ) =
fσ,c(λ)
fσ,c(Λ)
, ∀λ ∈ Λ,
where fσ,c(Λ) ,
∑
λ∈Λ fσ,c(λ) = fσ,Λ(c). Again for convenience, we write DΛ,σ = DΛ,σ,0.
It is also useful to define the discrete Gaussian distribution over a coset of Λ, i.e., the shifted lattice Λ− c:
DΛ−c,σ(λ − c) = fσ(λ− c)
fσ,c(Λ)
, ∀λ ∈ Λ.
Note the relation DΛ−c,σ(λ− c) = DΛ,σ,c(λ), namely, they are a shifted version of each other.
Each component of a lattice point sampled from DΛ−c,σ has an average power always less than σ2 by the
following lemma.
Lemma 1 (Average power of lattice Gaussian [30, Lemma 1]): Let x = (x1, x2, ..., xn)
T ∼ DΛ−c,σ. Then, for
each 1 ≤ i ≤ n,
E[x2i ] ≤ σ2. (2)
If the flatness factor is negligible, the discrete Gaussian distribution over a lattice preserves the capacity of the
AWGN channel.
Theorem 1 (Mutual information of discrete Gaussian distribution [30, Th. 2]): Consider an AWGN channel
Y = X + E where the input constellation X has a discrete Gaussian distribution DΛ−c,σs for arbitrary c ∈ Rn,
and where the variance of the noise E is σ2. Let the average signal power be Ps so that SNR = Ps/σ
2, and let
σ˜ , σsσ√
σ2s+σ
2
. Then, if ε = ǫΛ (σ˜) <
1
2 and
πεt
1−ǫt ≤ ε where
εt ,
 ǫΛ
(
σs/
√
π
π−t
)
, t ≥ 1/e
(t−4 + 1)ǫΛ
(
σs/
√
π
π−t
)
, 0 < t < 1/e
the discrete Gaussian constellation results in mutual information
ID ≥ 1
2
log (1 + SNR)− 5ε
n
(3)
per channel use. Moreover, the difference between Ps and σ
2
s is bounded by∣∣Ps − σ2s ∣∣ ≤ 2πǫtn(1− ǫ)σ2s .
A lattice Λ or its coset Λ− c with a discrete Gaussian distribution is referred to as a good constellation for the
AWGN channel if ǫΛ(σ˜) is negligible [30]. It is further proved in [30] that the channel capacity is achieved with
June 13, 2018 DRAFT
7Gaussian shaping over an AWGN-good lattice and minimum mean square error (MMSE) lattice decoding. Following
Theorem 1, it has been shown in [15] that an AWGN-good polar lattice shaped according to the discrete Gaussian
distribution achieves the AWGN channel capacity with sub-exponentially vanishing error probability, which means
that an explicit polar lattice satisfying the power constraint and the reliability condition for Bob is already in hand.
Therefore, the next section will focus on the construction of the secrecy-good polar lattice.
III. POLAR CODES AND POLAR LATTICES
A. Polar codes: brief review
We firstly recall some basics of polar codes. Let W˜ be a BMS channel with uniformly distributed input X ∈
X = {0, 1} and output Y ∈ Y . The input distribution and transition probability of W˜ are denoted by PX and PY|X
respectively. Let X[N ] and Y[N ] be the input and output vector of N independent uses of W˜ . Let N = 2m be the
block length of polar codes for some integer m ≥ 1. The channel polarization is based on the N -by-N transform
U[N ] = X[N ]GN , where GN = [ 1 01 1 ]
⊗m
is the generator matrix and ⊗ denotes the Kronecker product. Then we get
an N -dimensional combined channel W˜N from U
[N ] to Y[N ]. For each i ∈ [N ], given the previous bits U1:i−1, the
channel W˜
(i)
N seen by each bit U
i is called the i-th subchannel channel after the channel splitting process [7], and
the transition probability of W˜
(i)
N is given by
W˜
(i)
N (y
[N ], u1:i−1|ui) =
∑
ui+1:N∈XN−i
1
2N−1
W˜N (y
[N ]|u[N ]),
where u[N ] and y[N ] are the realizations of U[N ] and Y[N ], respectively. Arıkan proved that W˜
(i)
N is also a BMS
channel and it becomes either an almost error-free channel or a completely useless channel as N grows. According
to [7], the goodness of a BMS channel can be estimated by its associate Bhattacharyya parameter, which is defined
as follows.
Definition 3 (Bhattacharyya parameter of BMS channels): Let W˜ be a BMS channel with transition probability
PY|X, the symmetric Bhattacharyya parameter Z˜ ∈ [0, 1] is defined as
Z˜(W˜ ) ,
∑
y
√
PY|X(y|0)PY|X(y|1).
Remark 1. Although polar codes were originally proposed for binary-input discrete memoryless channels [7],
their extension to continuous channels, such as the binary-input AWGN channel, was given in [31]. To construct
polar codes efficiently, the authors proposed smart channel degrading and upgrading merging algorithms to quantize
continuous channels into their discrete versions. Fortunately, the quantization accuracy can be made arbitrarily small
by increasing the quantization level. For this reason, we still use the summation form of Bhattacharyya parameters
for continuous channels in this work, which also makes the notations consistent with the literature on polar codes.
It was further shown in [32], [33] that for any 0 < β < 12 ,
lim
m→∞
1
N
∣∣∣{i : Z˜(W˜ (i)N ) < 2−Nβ}∣∣∣ = I(W˜ )
lim
m→∞
1
N
∣∣∣{i : Z˜(W˜ (i)N ) > 1− 2−Nβ}∣∣∣ = 1− I(W˜ ),
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8which means the proportion of such roughly error-free subchannels (with negligible Bhattacharyya parameters)
approaches the channel capacity I(W˜ ). The set of the indices of all those almost error-free subchannels is usually
called the information set I and its complementary is called the frozen set F . Consequently, the construction of
capacity-achieving polar codes is simply to identify the indices in the information set I. However, for a general
BMS channel other than binary erasure channel, the complexity of the exact computation for Z˜(W˜
(i)
N ) appears to
be exponential in the block length N . An efficient estimation method for Z˜(W˜
(i)
N ) was proposed in [31], using the
idea of channel upgrading and degrading. It was shown that with a sufficient number of quantization levels, the
approximation error is negligible even if W˜ has continuous output, and the involved computational complexity is
acceptable.
In [7], a bit-wise decoding method called successive cancellation (SC) decoding was proposed to show that polar
codes are able to achieve channel capacity with vanishing error probability. This decoding method has complexity
O(N logN), and the error probability is given by PSCe ≤
∑
i∈I Z˜(W˜
(i)
N ).
B. Polar codes for the binary symmetric wiretap channel
Now we revisit the construction of polar codes for the binary symmetric wiretap channel. We use V˜ and W˜ to
denote the symmetric main channel between Alice and Bob and the symmetric wiretap channel between Alice and
Eve, respectively. Both V˜ and W˜ have binary input X and W˜ is degraded with respect to V˜ . Let Y and Z denote
the output of V˜ and W˜ . After the channel combination and splitting of N independent uses of the V˜ and W˜ by the
polarization transform U[N ] = X[N ]GN , we define the sets of reliability-good indices for Bob and information-poor
indices for Eve as
G(V˜ ) = {i : Z˜(V˜ (i)N ) ≤ 2−N
β},
N (W˜ ) = {i : Z˜(W˜ (i)N ) ≥ 1− 2−N
β},
(4)
where 0 < β < 0.5 and V˜
(i)
N (W˜
(i)
N ) is the i-th subchannel of the main channel (wiretapper’s channel) after
polarization transform.
Note that in the seminal paper [8] of polar wiretap coding, the information-poor set N (W˜ ) was defined as
{i : I(W˜ (i,N)) ≤ 2−Nβ}. In contrast, our criterion here is based on the Bhattacharyya parameter3. This slight
modification will bring us much convenience when lattice shaping is involved in Sect. V. The following lemma
shows that the modified criterion is similar to the original one in the sense that the mutual information of the
subchannels with indices in N (W˜ ) can still be bounded in the same form.
Lemma 2: Let W˜
(i)
N be the i-th subchannel after the polarization transform on independent N uses of a BMS
channel W˜ . For any 0 < β < 12 and δ > 0, if Z˜(W˜
(i)
N ) ≥ 1− 2−N
β
, the mutual information of the i-th subchannel
can be upper-bounded as
I(W˜
(i)
N ) ≤ 2−N
β′
,
where β(1− δ) ≤ β′ ≤ β when N is sufficiently large.
3This idea has already been used in [8] to prove that polar wiretap coding scheme is secrecy capacity-achieving.
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9Proof. When W˜ is symmetric, W˜
(i)
N is symmetric as well. By [7, Proposition 1], we have
I(W˜
(i)
N ) ≤
√
1− Z˜(W˜ (i)N )2
≤
√
2 · 2−Nβ
= 2−N
β′
,
where β′ < β. Moreover, for sufficiently large N , β′ can be made arbitrarily close to and β , i.e., β(1 − δ) ≤ β′
for any δ > 0.
Since the mutual information of subchannels in N (W˜ ) can be upper-bounded in the same form, it is not difficult
to understand that strong secrecy can be achieved using the index partition proposed in [8]. Similarly, we divide
the index set [N ] into the following four sets:
A = G(V˜ ) ∩N (W˜ ), B = G(V˜ ) ∩ N (W˜ )c
C = G(V˜ )c ∩N (W˜ ), D = G(V˜ )c ∩ N (W˜ )c.
(5)
Clearly, A∪ B ∪ C ∪ D = [N ]. Then we assign set A with message bits M, set B with uniformly random bits Rb,
set C with frozen bits F which are known to both Bob and Eve prior to transmission, and set D with uniformly
random bits Rd. The next lemma shows that this assignment achieves strong secrecy. We note that this proof is
similar to that in [8], [9] and it is given in [34, Appendix A].
Lemma 3: According to the partitions of the index set shown in (5), if we assign the four sets as follows
A ← M, B ← Rb,
C ← F, D ← Rd,
(6)
the information leakage I(M;Z[N ]) can be upper-bounded as
I(M;Z[N ]) ≤ N · 2−Nβ
′
, 0 < β′ < 0.5. (7)
We can also observe that the proportion of the problematic set D is arbitrarily small when N is sufficiently large.
This is because set D is a subset of the unpolarized set {i : 2−Nβ < Z˜(V˜ (i)N ) < 1− 2−N
β}. As has been shown in
[8], the reliability condition cannot be fulfilled with SC decoding due to the existence of D. Fortunately, we can
use the Markov block coding technique proposed in [9] to achieve reliability and strong secrecy simultaneously.
More details of this Markov block coding technique will be discussed in Section IV-B and Section V-D.
With regard to the secrecy rate, we show that the modified polar coding scheme can also achieve the secrecy
capacity.
Lemma 4: Let C(V˜ ) and C(W˜ ) denote the channel capacity of the main channel V˜ and wiretap channel W˜
respectively. Since W˜ is degraded with respect to V˜ , the secrecy capacity, which is given by C(V˜ ) − C(W˜ ), is
achievable using the modified wiretap coding scheme, i.e.,
lim
N→∞
|G(V˜ ) ∩ N (W˜ )|/N = C(V˜ )− C(W˜ ).
Proof. See [34, Appendix B].
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C. From polar codes to polar lattices
A sublattice Λ′ ⊂ Λ induces a partition (denoted by Λ/Λ′) of Λ into equivalence classes modulo Λ′. The order
of the partition is denoted by |Λ/Λ′|, which is equal to the number of cosets. If |Λ/Λ′| = 2, we call this a binary
partition. Let Λ/Λ1/ · · · /Λr−1/Λ′ for r ≥ 1 be an n-dimensional self-similar lattice partition chain4. For each
partition Λℓ−1/Λℓ (1 ≤ ℓ ≤ r with convention Λ0 = Λ and Λr = Λ′) a code Cℓ over Λℓ−1/Λℓ selects a sequence
of representatives aℓ for the cosets of Λℓ. Consequently, if each partition is binary, the code Cℓ is a binary code.
Polar lattices are constructed by “Construction D” [28, p.232] [27] using a set of nested polar codes C1 ⊆ C2 ··· ⊆
Cr. Suppose Cℓ has block length N and kℓ information bits for 1 ≤ ℓ ≤ r. Choose a basis g1,g2, · · · ,gN from
the polar generator matrix GN such that g1, · · ·gkℓ span Cℓ. When the dimension n = 1, we choose the partition
chain Z/2Z.../2rZ, then the lattice L admits the form [27]
L =
{
r∑
ℓ=1
2ℓ−1
kℓ∑
i=1
uiℓgi + 2
rZN | uiℓ ∈ {0, 1}
}
, (8)
where the addition is carried out in RN . The fundamental volume of a lattice obtained from this construction is
given by
Vol(L) = 2−NRC · Vol(Λr)N ,
where RC =
∑r
ℓ=1Rℓ =
1
N
∑r
ℓ=1 kℓ denotes the sum rate of component codes. In this paper, we limit ourselves
to the one-dimensional binary lattice partition chain and binary polar codes for simplicity.
IV. SECRECY-GOOD POLAR LATTICES FOR THE MOD-Λs GWC
Before considering the Gaussian wiretap channel, we will tackle a simpler problem of constructing secrecy-good
polar lattices over the mod-Λs GWC shown in Fig. 2. The difference between the mod-Λs GWC and the genuine
GWC is the mod-Λs operation on the received signal of Bob and Eve. We will assume uniform input messages
until we discuss semantic security in the end of this section.
A. Strong secrecy
With some abuse of notation, the outputs Y[N ] and Z[N ] at Bob and Eve’s ends respectively become
Y
[N ] =
[
X
[N ] +W
[N ]
b
]
mod Λs,
Z
[N ] =
[
X
[N ] +W[N ]e
]
mod Λs.
The idea of wiretap lattice coding over the mod-Λs GWC [6] can be explained as follows. Let Λb and Λe be
the AWGN-good lattice and secrecy-good lattice designed for Bob and Eve accordingly. Let Λs ⊂ Λe ⊂ Λb be a
nested chain of N -dimensional lattices in RN , where Λs is the shaping lattice. Note that the shaping lattice Λs here
is employed primarily for the convenience of designing the secrecy-good lattice and secondarily for satisfying the
power constraint. Consider a one-to-one mapping:M→ Λb/Λe which associates each message m ∈ M to a coset
4By saying self-similar, we mean that Λℓ = T
ℓΛ for all ℓ, with T = αV for some scale factor α > 1 and orthogonal matrix V . For
example, Z/2Z/.../2rZ is a one-dimensional self-similar partition chain.
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Fig. 2. The mod-Λs Gaussian wiretap channel.
λ˜m ∈ Λb/Λe. Alice selects a lattice point λ ∈ Λe ∩ V(Λs) uniformly at random and transmits X[N ] = λ + λm,
where λm is the coset representative of λ˜m in V(Λe). This scheme has been proved to achieve both reliability and
semantic security in [6] by random lattice codes. We will make it explicit by constructing polar lattice codes in
this section.
Let Λb and Λe be constructed from a binary partition chain Λ/Λ1/ · · · /Λr−1/Λr, and assume Λs ⊂ ΛNr such
that Λs ⊂ ΛNr ⊂ Λe ⊂ Λb5. Also, denote by X[N ]1:r the bits encoding ΛN/ΛNr , which include all information bits for
message M as a subset. We have that
[
X[N ] +W
[N ]
e
]
mod ΛNr is a sufficient statistic for X
[N ]
1:r . This can be seen
from [27, Lemma 8], rewritten as follows:
Lemma 5 (Sufficiency of mod-Λ output [27]): For a partition chain Λ/Λ′ (Λ′ ⊂ Λ), let the input of an AWGN
channel be X = A+B, where A ∈ R(Λ) is a random variable, and B is uniformly distributed in Λ∩R(Λ′). Reduce
the output Y first to Y′ = Y mod Λ′ and then to Y′′ = Y′ mod Λ. Then the mod-Λ map is information-lossless,
namely I(A;Y′) = I(A;Y′′), which means that the output Y′′ = Y′ mod Λ of mod-Λ map is a sufficient statistic
for A.
In our context, we identify Λ with ΛNr and Λ
′ with Λs, respectively. Since the bits encoding ΛNr /Λs are uniformly
distributed6, the mod-ΛNr operation is information-lossless in the sense that
I
(
X
[N ]
1:r ;Z
[N ]
)
= I
(
X
[N ]
1:r ; [X
[N ] +W[N ]e ] mod Λ
N
r
)
.
As far as mutual information I
(
X
[N ]
1:r ;Z
[N ]
)
is concerned, we can use the mod-ΛNr operator instead of the mod-Λs
operator here. Under this condition, we use the multilevel lattice structure introduced in [27] to decompose the
mod-Λs channel into a series of BMS channels according to the partition chain Λ/Λ1/ · · · /Λr−1/Λr. Therefore,
the afore-mentioned polar coding technique for BMS channels can be employed. Moreover, the channel resulted
from the lattice partition chain can be proved to be equivalent to that based on the chain rule of mutual information
5This is always possible with sufficient power, since the power constraint is not our primary concern in this section. We can scale Λs as
large as possible to make Λs ⊂ ΛNr .
6In fact, all bits encoding Λe/Λs are uniformly distributed in wiretap coding.
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(See (11)). Following this channel equivalence, we can construct an AWGN-good lattice Λb and a secrecy-good
lattice Λe, using the wiretap coding technique (4) at each partition level.
A mod-Λ channel is a Gaussian channel with a modulo-Λ operator in the front end [27], [35]. The capacity of
the mod-Λ channel is [27]
C(Λ, σ2) = log(Vol(Λ))− h(Λ, σ2), (9)
where h(Λ, σ2) is the differential entropy of the Λ-aliased noise over R(Λ):
h(Λ, σ2) = −
∫
R(Λ)
fσ,Λ(t) log fσ,Λ(t)dt.
The differential entropy reaches its maximum log(Vol(Λ)) by the uniform distribution over R(Λ). The Λℓ−1/Λℓ
channel is defined as a mod-Λℓ channel whose input is drawn from Λℓ−1 ∩ R(Λℓ). It is known that the Λℓ−1/Λℓ
channel is symmetric7, and the optimum input distribution is uniform [27]. Furthermore, the Λℓ−1/Λℓ channel is
binary if |Λℓ−1/Λℓ| = 2. The capacity of the Λℓ−1/Λℓ channel for Gaussian noise of variance σ2 is given by [27]
C(Λℓ−1/Λℓ, σ2) = C(Λℓ, σ2)− C(Λℓ−1, σ2)
= h(Λℓ−1, σ2)− h(Λℓ, σ2) + log(Vol(Λℓ)/Vol(Λℓ−1)).
The decomposition into a set of Λℓ−1/Λℓ channels is used in [27] to construct AWGN-good lattices. Take the
partition chain Z/2Z/ · · · /2rZ as an example. Given uniform input X1:r, let Kℓ denote the coset indexed by x1:ℓ,
i.e., Kℓ = x1 + · · · + 2ℓ−1xℓ + 2ℓZ. Given that X1:ℓ−1 = x1:ℓ−1, the conditional probability distribution function
(PDF) of this channel with binary input Xℓ and output Z¯ = Z mod Λℓ is
fZ¯|Xℓ(z¯|xℓ) =
1√
2πσe
∑
a∈Kℓ(x1:ℓ)
exp
(
− 1
2σ2e
‖z¯ − a‖2
)
. (10)
Since the previous input bits x1:ℓ−1 cause a shift on Kℓ and will be removed by the multistage decoder at level ℓ, the
code can be designed according to the channel transition probability (10) with x1:ℓ−1 = 0. Following the notation of
[27], we use V (Λℓ−1/Λℓ, σ2b ) and W (Λℓ−1/Λℓ, σ
2
e) to denote the Λℓ−1/Λℓ channel for Bob and Eve respectively.
The Λℓ−1/Λℓ channel can also be used to construct secrecy-good lattices. In order to bound the information leakage
of the wiretapper’s channel, we firstly express I(X1:r;Z) according to the chain rule of mutual information as
I(X1:r;Z) = I(X1;Z) + I(X2;Z|X1) + · · ·+ I(Xr;Z|X1:r−1). (11)
This equation still holds if Z denotes the noisy signal after the mod-Λr operation, namely, Z = [X+We] mod Λr. We
will adopt this notation in the rest of this subsection. We refer to the ℓ-th channel associated with mutual information
I(Xℓ;Z|X1:ℓ−1) as the equivalent channel denoted by W ′(Xℓ;Z|X1:ℓ−1), which is defined as the channel from Xℓ
to Z given the previous X1:ℓ−1. Then the transition probability distribution of W ′(Xℓ;Z|X1:ℓ−1) is [27, Lemma 6]
fZ|Xℓ(z|xℓ) =
1
Pr(Kℓ(x1:ℓ))
∑
a∈Kℓ(x1:ℓ)
Pr(a)fZ(z|a)
=
1
|Λℓ/Λr|
1√
2πσe
∑
a∈Kℓ(x1:ℓ)
exp
(
− 1
2σ2e
‖z − a‖2
)
, z ∈ V(Λr).
(12)
7This is “regular” in the sense of Delsarte and Piret and symmetric in the sense of Gallager [27].
June 13, 2018 DRAFT
13
From (10) and (12), we can observe that the channel output likelihood ratio (LR) of theW (Λℓ−1/Λℓ, σ2e) channel
is equal to that of the ℓ-th equivalent channel W ′(Xℓ;Z|X1:ℓ−1). Then we have the following channel equivalence
lemma.
Lemma 6: Consider a lattice L constructed by a binary lattice partition chain Λ/Λ1/ · · · /Λr−1/Λr. Constructing
a polar code for the ℓ-th equivalent binary-input channel W ′(Xℓ;Z|X1:ℓ−1) defined by the chain rule (11) is
equivalent to constructing a polar code for the Λℓ−1/Λℓ channel W (Λℓ−1/Λℓ, σ2e), i.e., the mutual information
and Bhattacharyya parameters of the subchannels resulted from W ′(Xℓ;Z|X1:ℓ−1) are equivalent to that of the
subchannels resulted from W (Λℓ−1/Λℓ, σ2e), respectively.
Proof. See Appendix C.
Note that another proof based on direct calculation of the mutual information and Bhattacharyya parameters of
the subchannels can be found in [36].
Remark 2. Observe that if we define V ′(Xℓ;Y|X1:ℓ−1) as the equivalent channel according to the chain rule expan-
sion of I(X;Y) for the main channel, the same result can be obtained between V (Λℓ−1/Λℓ, σ2b ) and V
′(Xℓ;Y|X1:ℓ−1).
Moreover, this lemma also holds without the mod-Λs front-end, i.e., without power constraint. The construction of
AWGN-good polar lattices was given in [15], where nested polar codes were constructed based on a set of Λℓ−1/Λℓ
channels. We note that the Λℓ−1/Λℓ channel is degraded with respect to the Λℓ/Λℓ+1 channel [15, Lemma 3].
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Fig. 3. The multilevel lattice coding system over the mod-Λs Gaussian wiretap channel.
Now we are ready to introduce the polar lattice construction for the mod-Λs GWC shown in Fig. 3. A polar
lattice L is constructed by a series of nested polar codes C1(N, k1) ⊆ C2(N, k2) ⊆ · · · ⊆ Cr(N, kr) and a binary
lattice partition chain Λ/Λ1/ · · · /Λr. The block length of polar codes is N . Alice splits the message M into
M1, · · ·,Mr. We follow the same rule (6) to assign bits in the component polar codes to achieve strong secrecy.
Note that W (Λℓ−1/Λℓ, σ2e) is degraded with respect to V (Λℓ−1/Λℓ, σ2b ) for 1 ≤ ℓ ≤ r because σ2b ≤ σ2e . Treating
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V (Λℓ−1/Λℓ, σ2b ) and W (Λℓ−1/Λℓ, σ
2
e) as the main channel and wiretapper’s channel at each level and using the
partition rule (5), we can get four sets Aℓ, Bℓ, Cℓ and Dℓ. Similarly, we assign the bits as follows
Aℓ ← Mℓ, Bℓ ← Rbℓ,
Cℓ ← Fℓ, Dℓ ← Rdℓ
(13)
for each level ℓ, where Mℓ, Fℓ and R
b
ℓ (R
d
ℓ ) represent message bits, frozen bits (could be set as all zeros) and
uniformly random bits for set Bℓ (Dℓ) at level ℓ. Since the Λℓ−1/Λℓ channel is degraded with respect to the
Λℓ/Λℓ+1 channel. According to [33, Lemma 4.7], when a BMS channel W˜ is degraded with respect to a BMS
channel V˜ , the Bhattacharyya parameters of the subchannels satisfy Z˜(W˜
(i)
N ) ≥ Z˜(V˜ (i)N ). Thus, it is easy to obtain
that Cℓ ⊇ Cℓ+1, which means Aℓ∪Bℓ∪Dℓ ⊆ Aℓ+1∪Bℓ+1∪Dℓ+1. This construction is clearly a lattice construction
as polar codes constructed for each level are nested. We skip the proof of nested polar codes here. A similar proof
can be found in [14] and [15].
As a result, the above multilevel construction yields an AWGN-good lattice Λb and a secrecy-good lattice Λe
simultaneously. More precisely, Λb is constructed from a set of nested polar codes C1(N, |A1| + |B1| + |D1|) ⊆
· · · ⊆ Cr(N, |Ar|+ |Br|+ |Dr|), while Λe is constructed from a set of nested polar codes C1(N, |B1|+ |D1|) ⊆
· · · ⊆ Cr(N, |Br| + |Dr|) and with the same lattice partition chain. Note that the random bits in set Dℓ should
be shared to Bob to guarantee the AWGN-goodness of Λb. More details will be given in the next subsection. It
is clear that Λe ⊂ Λb. Thus, our proposed coding scheme instantiates the coset coding scheme introduced in [6],
where the confidential message is mapped to the coset λ˜m ∈ Λb/Λe. However, unlike the work of [6], our scheme
does not require an asymptotically vanishing flatness factor, since the upper-bound of the information leakage can
be calculated directly. The flatness factor will show up with the lattice Gaussian shaping in the next section.
By using the above assignments and Lemma 3, we have
I
(
MℓFℓ;Z
[N ]
ℓ
)
≤ N2−Nβ
′
, (14)
where Z
[N ]
ℓ = Z
[N ] mod Λℓ is the output of the Λℓ−1/Λℓ channel for Eve. In other words, the employed polar
code for the channel W (Λℓ−1/Λℓ, σ2e) can guarantee that the mutual information between the input message and
the output is upper bounded by N2−N
β′
.
We assume uniform Mℓ and Fℓ such that Xℓ is uniformly distributed at each level. We will remove this
restriction to the uniform distribution in Proposition 1. According to Lemma 6, the constructed polar code can
also guarantee the same upper-bound on the mutual information between the input message and the output of the
channel W ′(Xℓ;Z|X1:ℓ−1), as shown in the following inequality (Xℓ is independent of the previous X1:ℓ−1):
I
(
MℓFℓ;Z
[N ],X
[N ]
1:ℓ−1
)
≤ N2−Nβ
′
.
Recall that Z[N ] is the signal received by Eve after the mod-Λr operation. Let F denote the combination of
F1,F2, ...,Fr. From the chain rule of mutual information, we obtain
I
(
MF;Z[N ]
)
=
r∑
ℓ=1
I
(
Z
[N ];MℓFℓ|M1:ℓ−1F1:ℓ−1
)
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=
r∑
ℓ=1
H(MℓFℓ|M1:ℓ−1F1:ℓ−1)−H
(
MℓFℓ|Z[N ],M1:ℓ−1F1:ℓ−1
)
≤
r∑
ℓ=1
H(MℓFℓ)−H
(
MℓFℓ|Z[N ],M1:ℓ−1F1:ℓ−1
)
(15)
=
r∑
ℓ=1
I
(
MℓFℓ;Z
[N ],M1:ℓ−1F1:ℓ−1
)
≤
r∑
ℓ=1
I
(
MℓFℓ;Z
[N ],X
[N ]
1:ℓ−1
)
≤ rN2−Nβ
′
,
where the second inequality holds because I
(
MℓFℓ;Z
[N ],X
[N ]
1:ℓ−1
)
= I
(
MℓFℓ;Z
[N ],U
[N ]
1:ℓ−1
)
and adding more
variables will not decrease the mutual information. Since limN→∞ I
(
MF;Z[N ]
)
= 0, strong secrecy is achieved.
B. Achieving secrecy capacity
In the original polar coding scheme for the binary wiretap channel [8], how to assign set D is a problem.
Assigning frozen bits to D guarantees reliability but only achieves weak secrecy, whereas assigning random bits
to D guarantees strong secrecy but may violate the reliability requirement because D may be nonempty. In order
to ensure strong secrecy, D is assigned with random bits (D ← R), which makes this scheme failed to accomplish
the theoretical reliability. In simple words, to satisfy the strong secrecy and reliability conditions simultaneously,
the bits corresponding to D must be kept frozen to Bob but uniformly random to Eve. For any ℓ-th level channel
V (Λℓ−1/Λℓ, σ2b ) at Bob’s end, if set Dℓ is fed with random bits, the probability of error is upper-bounded by the
sum of the Bhattacharyya parameters Z˜(V
(j)
N (Λℓ−1/Λℓ, σ
2
b )) of subchannels that are not frozen to zero [7]. For
each bit-channel index j and β < 0.5, we have
j ∈ G(V (Λℓ−1/Λℓ, σ2b )) ∪ Dℓ.
By the definition (4), the sum of Z˜(V
(j)
N (Λℓ−1/Λℓ, σ
2
b )) over the set G(V (Λℓ−1/Λℓ, σ2b )) is bounded by 2−N
β
,
therefore the error probability of the ℓ-th level channel under the SC decoding, denoted by PSCe (Λℓ−1/Λℓ, σ
2
b ), can
be upper-bounded by [7]
PSCe (Λℓ−1/Λℓ, σ
2
b ) ≤ N2−N
β
+
∑
j∈Dℓ
Z˜(V
(j)
N (Λℓ−1/Λℓ, σ
2
b )).
Since multistage decoding is utilized, by the union bound, the final decoding error probability for Bob is bounded
as
Pr{M̂ 6= M} ≤
r∑
i=1
PSCe (Λℓ−1/Λℓ, σ
2
b ).
Unfortunately, a bound on the sum
∑
j∈Dℓ Z˜(V
(j)
N (Λℓ−1/Λℓ, σ
2
b )) is unavailable, making the proof of reliability
out of reach. There is numerical evidence of low probabilities of error nonetheless. The proportion of Dℓ vanishes
as N → ∞ [8, Prop. 22]. In fact, numerical examples in [8, Sect. VI-F] showed that Dℓ = ∅ in most cases of
interest. In any case, Bob can run some exhaustive search or form a small list of paths for those unreliable indexes.
The reliability problem was recently solved in [9], where a new scheme dividing the information message into
several blocks was proposed. For a specific block, Dℓ is still assigned with random bits and transmitted in advance
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in the set Aℓ of the previous block. This scheme involves negligible rate loss and finally realizes reliability and
strong security simultaneously. In this case, if the reliability of each partition channel can be achieved, i.e., for any
ℓ-th level partition Λℓ−1/Λℓ, PSCe (Λℓ−1/Λℓ, σ2b ) vanishes as N →∞, then the total decoding error probability for
Bob can be made arbitrarily small. Consequently, based on this new scheme of assigning the problematic set, the
error probability on level ℓ can be upper-bounded by
PSCe (Λℓ−1/Λℓ, σ
2
b ) ≤ ǫℓN ′ + kℓ ·O(2−N
′β
), (16)
where kℓ is the number of information blocks on the ℓ-th level, N
′ is the length of each block which satisfies
N ′ × kℓ = N and ǫℓN ′ is caused by the first separate block consisting of the initial bits in Dℓ at the ℓ-th level.
Since |Dℓ| is extremely small comparing to the block length N , the decoding failure probability for the first block
can be made arbitrarily small when N is sufficiently large. Meanwhile, by the analysis in [15], when h(Λ, σ2b )→
log(V (Λ)), h(Λr, σ
2
b ) → 12 log(2πeσ2b ), and RC → C(Λ/Λr, σ2b ), we have γΛb(σb) → 2πe. Therefore, Λb is an
AWGN-good lattice8.
Note that the rate loss incurred by repeatedly transmitted bits in Dℓ is negligible because of its small size.
Specifically, the actual secrecy rate in the ℓ-th level is given by kℓkℓ+1 [C(Λℓ−1/Λℓ, σ
2
b )−C(Λℓ−1/Λℓ, σ2e)]. Clearly,
this rate can be made close to the secrecy capacity by choosing sufficiently large kℓ as well.
Theorem 2 (Achieving secrecy capacity of the mod-Λs GWC): Consider a sequence of multi-level polar lattices
L(N) of increasing dimensions N . Let L(N) be constructed according to (13) with the binary lattice partition
chain Λ/Λ1/ · · · /Λr and r binary nested polar codes where r = O(logN). Scale the lattice partition chain to
satisfy the following conditions:
(i) ǫΛ(σb)→ 0,
(ii) ǫe =
1
2 log(2πeσ
2
e)− h(Λr, σ2e)→ 0.
Given σ2e > σ
2
b , the secrecy capacity
1
2 log
σ2e
σ2
b
of the mod-Λs Gaussian wiretap channel is achievable by using the
polar lattices L(N), i.e., for any rate R < 12 log
σ2e
σ2
b
, there exists a sufficiently large N such that the realized rate
R(N) of L(N) satisfies R(N) > R.
8More precisely, to make Λb AWGN-good, we need Pe(Λb, σ
2
b
) → 0 by definition. By [15, Theorem 2], Pe(Λb, σ
2
b
) ≤ rN2−N
β
+
N · Pe(Λr , σ2b ). According to the analysis in Remark 6, r = O(logN) is sufficient to guarantee Pe(Λr , σ
2
b
) = e−Ω(N), meaning that a
sub-exponentially vanishing Pe(Λb, σ
2
b
) can be achieved.
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Proof. By Lemma 4 and (13),
lim
N→∞
R(N) =
r∑
ℓ=1
lim
N→∞
|Aℓ|
N
=
r∑
ℓ=1
C(Vℓ)− C(Wℓ)
=
r∑
ℓ=1
C(V (Λℓ−1/Λℓ, σ2b ))− C(W (Λℓ−1/Λℓ, σ2e))
= C(V (Λ/Λr, σ
2
b ))− C(W (Λ/Λr, σ2e))
= C(Λr, σ
2
b )− C(Λ, σ2b )− C(Λr, σ2e) + C(Λ, σ2e)
= h(Λr, σ
2
e)− h(Λr, σ2b ) + h(Λ, σ2b )− h(Λ, σ2e)
=
1
2
log
σ2e
σ2b
− (ǫe − ǫb)− ǫ1,
(17)
where 
ǫ1 = C(Λ, σ
2
b )− C(Λ, σ2e) = h(Λ, σ2e)− h(Λ, σ2b ) ≥ 0,
ǫb = h(σ
2
b )− h(Λr, σ2b ) = 12 log(2πeσ2b )− h(Λr, σ2b ) ≥ 0,
ǫe = h(σ
2
e)− h(Λr, σ2e) = 12 log(2πeσ2e)− h(Λr, σ2e) ≥ 0
and ǫe − ǫb ≥ 0.
By scaling Λ, we can have h(Λ, σ2b ) → log(Vol(Λ)). Since σ2e > σ2b , we also have h(Λ, σ2e) → log(Vol(Λ)).
More precisely, by [15, Lemma 1], ǫ1 can be upper-bounded by the flatness factor as
ǫ1 ≤ C(Λ, σ2b ) ≤ log(e) · ǫΛ(σb).
Then, according to [6, Corollary 1], we can make ǫΛ(σb)→ 0 by scaling Λ.
The number of levels is set such that h(Λr, σ
2
e) → 12 log(2πeσ2e). By [15, Theorem 2], r = O(logN) is
sufficient to guarantee Pe(Λr, σ
2
b ) = e
−Ω(N), meaning that the volume Vol(Λr) is sufficiently large such that
h(Λr, σ
2
e) → 12 log(2πeσ2e) as N → ∞. Again, since σ2e > σ2b , we immediately have h(Λr, σ2b ) → 12 log(2πeσ2e),
and ǫe − ǫb → 0. Therefore by scaling Λ and adjusting r, the secrecy rate can get arbitrarily close to 12 log σ
2
e
σ2
b
.
Remark 3. The constructed lattice Λe is secrecy-good in the sense of Definition 2. Recall that Λe is constructed
from the partition chain Λ/ · · · /Λr, which gives us the N -dimensional partition chain ΛN/Λe/ΛNr . Then,
C(Λe, σ
2
e) = C(Λ
N , σ2e) + C(Λ
N/Λe, σ
2
e)
= C(ΛN , σ2e) + I(MF;Z
[N ])
≤ log(e) · ǫΛN (σe) + I(MF;Z[N ])
≤ log(e) · ([1 + ǫΛ(σe)]N − 1) + I(MF;Z[N ]),
where we use [6, Corollary 1] and [30, Lemma 3] in the last two inequalities, respectively.
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Since r = O(logN), the top lattice Λ can be scaled down so that ǫΛ(σe) vanishes as fast as O(2
−√N ) by [37,
Proposition 2]. When N →∞, we have
C(Λe, σ
2
e) ≤ N log(e) · ǫΛ(σe) + I(MF;Z[N ]) +O(2−
√
N ).
Recalling (15), we immediately have C(Λe, σ
2
e)→ 0.
Meanwhile, following the analysis of [15], we can show that the VNR γΛe(σ
2
e) → 2πe from below. More
precisely, the logarithmic VNR of Λe satisfies
log
(
γL(σ)
2πe
)
= 2(ǫe1 − ǫe2 − ǫe3)
where 
ǫe1 = C(Λ, σ
2
e)
ǫe2 =
1
2 log 2πeσ
2
e − h(Λr, σ2e)
ǫe3 =
∑r
ℓ=1Rℓ − C(Λℓ−1/Λℓ, σ2e).
(18)
We note that, ǫe1 ≤ C(Λ, σ2b )→ 0, ǫe2 → 0 (condition (ii) in Theorem 2), and ǫ3 is the total extra rate of component
codes to guarantee security. Since Rℓ = |Rℓ|/N = (|Br|+ |Dr|)/N → C(Λℓ−1/Λℓ, σ2e), we also have ǫ3 → 0.
Let UR(Λe) denote the uniform distribution over a fundamental regionR(Λe). Note that condition C(Λe, σ2e)→ 0
implies the following statements, which all state that the distribution fσe,Λe of the mod-Λe Gaussian noise converges
to the uniform distribution:
1) Differential entropy h(Λe, σ
2
e)→ log(Vol(Λe));
2) Kullback-Leibler divergence D(fσe,Λe‖UR(Λe))→ 0;
3) Variational distance V(fσe,Λe , UR(Λe))→ 0
where 1) is by definition, 2) from the relation between mutual information and Kullback-Leibler divergence9, and
3) by Pinsker’s inequality.
Remark 4. The secrecy capacity of the mod-Λs Gaussian wiretap channel per use is given by
Cs =
1
N
C(Λs, σ
2
b )−
1
N
C(Λs, σ
2
e) =
1
N
h(Λs, σ
2
e)−
1
N
h(Λs, σ
2
b )
since the wiretapper’s channel is degraded with respect to the main channel. Because h(Λr, σ
2
e) → 12 log(2πeσ2e)
and Λs ⊂ ΛNr , we have 1N h(Λs, σ2e) → 12 log(2πeσ2e) and 1N h(Λs, σ2b ) → 12 log(2πeσ2b ). Hence Cs → 12 log σ
2
e
σ2
b
.
It also equals the secrecy capacity of the Gaussian wiretap channel when the signal power goes to infinity. It is
noteworthy that we successfully remove the 12 -nat gap in the achievable secrecy rate derived in [6] which is caused
by the limitation of the L∞ distance associated with the flatness factor.
Remark 5. The mild conditions (i) and (ii) stated in the theorem are easy to meet, by scaling top lattice Λ and
choosing the number of levels r appropriately. Consider an example for σ2e = 4 and σ
2
b = 1. We choose r = 3
9In fact, it is easy to show that D(fσe,Λe‖UR(Λe)) = log(Vol(Λe)) − h(Λe, σ
2
e) = C(Λe, σ
2
e), thanks to the symmetry of the mod-Λe
channel.
June 13, 2018 DRAFT
19
levels and a partition chain Z/2Z/4Z with scaling factor 2.5. The difference between the achievable rate computed
from (17) and the upper bound 12 log
σ2e
σ2
b
on secrecy capacity is about 0.05.
Remark 6. From conditions (i) and (ii), we can see that the construction for secrecy-good lattices requires more
levels than the construction of AWGN-good lattices. ǫ1 can be made arbitrarily small by scaling down Λ such
that both h(Λ, σ2e) and h(Λ, σ
2
b ) are sufficiently close to log(Vol(Λ)). For polar lattices for AWGN-goodness [14],
we only need h(Λr′ , σ
2
b ) ≈ 12 log(2πeσ2b ) for some r′ < r. Since ǫb < ǫe, Λr′ may be not enough for the
wiretapper’s channel. Therefore, more levels are needed in the wiretap coding context. To satisfy the condition
h(Λr, σ
2
e) → 12 log(2πeσ2e), it is sufficient to guarantee that Pe(Λr, σ2e) → 0 by [27, Theorem 13]. When one-
dimensional binary partition Z/2Z/4Z/... is used, we have Pe(Λr, σ
2
e) ≤ Q( 2
r
2σe
) ≤ e−
22r
8σ2e , where Q(·) is the
Q-function. Letting r = O(logN), the error probability vanishes as Pe(Λr, σ
2
e) = e
−Ω(N), which implies that
h(Λr, σ
2
e)→ 12 log(2πeσ2e) as N →∞. We also note that when lattice Gaussian shaping is considered in Sect. V,
the probability of selecting a lattice point from Λr decays exponentially as r increases. The requirement is relaxed
to r = O(log log(N)) to achieve the secrecy capacity.
C. Semantic security
So far we have assumed that the message is uniformly distributed. In fact, this assumption is not needed because
of the symmetry of the Λb/Λe channel [27]. It is well known that the error probability of polar codes in a symmetric
channel is independent of the transmitted message [7]; thus the input distribution does not matter for reliability.
Moreover, the foregoing security analysis also implies semantic security, i.e., (15) holds for arbitrarily distributed
M and F. This Λb/Λe channel can be seen as the counterpart in lattice coding of the randomness-induced channel
defined in [8].
Proposition 1: Semantic security holds for the polar lattice construction for the mod-Λs GWC shown in Fig. 3,
i.e.,
I
(
MF;Z[N ]
)
≤ rN2−Nβ
′
for arbitrarily distributed M and F.
Proof. Since MF is drawn from R(Λe) and the random bits are drawn from Λe∩R(Λs), by Lemma 5, the mod-Λe
map is information lossless and its output is a sufficient statistic for MF. Therefore, the channel between MF and
the eavesdropper can be viewed as a Λb/Λe channel. Because the Λb/Λe channel is symmetric, the maximum
mutual information is achieved by the uniform input. Consequently, the mutual information corresponding to other
input distributions can also be upper-bounded by rN2−N
β′
as in (15), and we can also freeze the bits F.
V. ACHIEVING SECRECY CAPACITY WITH DISCRETE GAUSSIAN SHAPING
In this section, we apply Gaussian shaping on the AWGN-good and secrecy-good polar lattices. The idea of
lattice Gaussian shaping was proposed in [30] and then implemented in [15] to construct capacity-achieving polar
lattices. For wiretap coding, the discrete Gaussian distribution can also be utilized to satisfy the power constraint. In
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simple terms, after obtaining the AWGN-good lattice Λb and the secrecy-good lattice Λe, Alice maps each message
m to a coset λ˜m ∈ Λb/Λe as mentioned in Sect. IV. However, instead of the mod-Λs operation, Alice samples the
encoded signal XN from DΛe+λm,σs , where λm is the coset representative of λ˜m and σ
2
s is arbitrarily close to the
signal power Ps (see [6] for more details). Again, we assume uniform messages until we prove semantic security
in the end of this section.
The construction of polar lattices with Gaussian shaping is reviewed in Sect. V-A. With Gaussian shaping, we
propose a new partition of the index set for the genuine GWC in Sect. V-B. Strong secrecy is proved in Sect. V-C,
and reliability is then discussed in Sect. V-D. Extension to semantical security is given in Sect. V-E. Moreover, we
will show that this shaping operation does not hurt the secrecy rate and that the secrecy capacity can be achieved.
A. Gaussian shaping over polar lattices
In this subsection, we introduce the lattice shaping technique for polar lattices. The idea is to select the lattice
points according to a carefully chosen lattice Gaussian distribution, which makes a non-uniform input distribution
for each partition channel. As shown in [15], the shaping scheme is based on the technique of polar codes for
asymmetric channels. For the paper to be self-contained, a brief review will be presented in this subsection. A more
detailed account of Gaussian shaping can be found in [15].
Similarly to the polar coding on symmetric channels, the Bhattacharyya parameter for a binary memoryless
asymmetric (BMA) channel is defined as follows.
Definition 4 (Bhattacharyya parameter for BMA channel): Let W be a BMA channel with input X ∈ X = {0, 1}
and output Y ∈ Y . The input distribution and channel transition probability is denoted by PX and PY|X respectively.
The Bhattacharyya parameter Z for W is the defined as
Z(X|Y) = 2
∑
y
PY(y)
√
PX|Y(0|y)PX|Y(1|y)
= 2
∑
y
√
PX,Y(0, y)PX,Y(1, y).
The following lemma, which will be useful for the forthcoming new partition scheme, shows that by adding
observable at the output of W , Z will not increase.
Lemma 7 (Conditioning reduces Bhattacharyya parameter Z [15]): Let (X,Y,Y′) ∼ PX,Y,Y′ , X ∈ X = {0, 1},Y ∈
Y,Y′ ∈ Y ′, we have
Z(X|Y,Y′) ≤ Z(X|Y).
When X is uniformly distributed, the Bhattacharyya parameter of BMA channels coincides with that of BMS
channels defined in Definition 3. Moreover, the calculation of Z can be converted to the calculation of the
Bhattacharyya parameter Z˜ for a related BMS channel. The following lemma is implicitly considered in [38]
and then explicitly expressed in [15]. We show it here for completeness.
Lemma 8 (From Asymmetric to Symmetric channel [15]): LetW be a binary input asymmetric channel with input
X ∈ X = {0, 1} and Y ∈ Y . We define a new channel W˜ corresponding to W which has input X˜ ∈ X = {0, 1}
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and output Y˜ ∈ Y × X . The relationship between W˜ and W is shown in Fig. 4. The input of W˜ is uniformly
distributed, i.e., P
X˜
(x˜ = 0) = P
X˜
(x˜ = 1) = 12 , and the output of W˜ is given by (Y,X ⊕ X˜), where ⊕ denotes the
bitwise XOR operation. Then, W˜ is a binary symmetric channel in the sense that P
Y˜|X˜(y, x⊕ x˜|x˜) = PY,X(y, x).
 !
 "
 #  !
$
$!
#
Fig. 4. The relationship between W˜ and W .
The following lemma describes how to construct a polar code for a BMA channelW from that for the associated
BMS channel W˜ .
Lemma 9 (The equivalence between symmetric and asymmetric Bhattacharyya parameters [38]): For a BMA
channel W with input X ∼ PX, let W˜ be its symmetrized channel constructed according to Lemma 8. Suppose
X[N ] and Y[N ] be the input and output vectors of WN , and let X˜[N ] and Y˜[N ] =
(
X[N ] ⊕ X˜[N ],Y[N ]
)
be the
input and output vectors of W˜N , where X˜ is uniform. Consider polarized random variables U[N ]=X[N ]GN and
U˜[N ]=X˜[N ]GN , and denote by WN and W˜N the combining channel of N uses of W and W˜ , respectively. The
Bhattacharyya parameter for each subchannel of WN is equal to that of each subchannel of W˜N , i.e.,
Z
(
U
i|U1:i−1,Y[N ]
)
= Z˜
(
U˜
i|U˜1:i−1,X[N ] ⊕ X˜[N ],Y[N ]
)
.
To obtain the desired input distribution of PX for W , the indices with very small Z(U
i|U1:i−1) should be
removed from the information set of the symmetric channel. Following [15], the resultant subset is referred to as
the information set I for the asymmetric channel W . For the remaining part Ic, we further find out that there
are some bits which can be made independent of the information bits and uniformly distributed. The purpose of
extracting such bits is for the interest of our lattice construction. We name the set that includes those independent
frozen bits as the independent frozen set F , and the remaining frozen bits are determined by the bits in F ∪I. We
name the set of all those deterministic bits as the shaping set S. The three sets are formally defined as follows:
the independent frozen set: F =
{
i ∈ [N ] : Z(Ui|U1:i−1,Y[N ]) ≥ 1− 2−Nβ
}
the information set: I =
{
i ∈ [N ] : Z(Ui|U1:i−1,Y[N ]) ≤ 2−Nβ and Z(Ui|U1:i−1) ≥ 1− 2−Nβ
}
the shaping set: S = (F ∪ I)c .
(19)
To identify these three sets, one can use Lemma 9 to calculate Z(Ui|U1:i−1,Y[N ],X[N ]) using the known
constructing techniques for symmetric polar codes [31] [39]. We note that Z(Ui|U1:i−1) can be computed in a
similar way, by constructing a symmetric channel between X˜ and X ⊕ X˜. Besides the construction, the decoding
process for the asymmetric polar codes can also be converted to the decoding for the symmetric polar codes.
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The polar coding scheme according to (19), which can be viewed as an extension of the scheme proposed in [38],
has been proved to be capacity-achieving in [15]. Moreover, it can be extended to the construction of multilevel
asymmetric polar codes.
Let us describe the encoding strategy for the channel of the ℓ-th (ℓ ≤ r) level Wℓ with the channel transition
probability PY|Xℓ,X1:ℓ−1(y|xℓ, x1:ℓ−1) as follows.
• Encoding: Before sending the codeword x[N ]ℓ = u
[N ]
ℓ GN , the index set [N ] are divided into three parts: the
independent frozen set Fℓ, information set Iℓ, and shaping set Sℓ, which are defined as follows:
Fℓ =
{
i ∈ [N ] : Z
(
U
i
ℓ|U1:i−1ℓ ,X[N ]1:ℓ−1,Y[N ]
)
≥ 1− 2−Nβ
}
Iℓ =
{
i ∈ [N ] : Z
(
U
i
ℓ|U1:i−1ℓ ,X[N ]1:ℓ−1,Y[N ]
)
≤ 2−Nβ and Z
(
U
i
ℓ|U1:i−1ℓ ,X[N ]1:ℓ−1
)
≥ 1− 2−Nβ
}
Sℓ = (Fℓ ∪ Iℓ)c .
The encoder first places uniformly distributed information bits in Iℓ. Then the frozen set Fℓ is filled with a
uniform random sequence which is shared between the encoder and the decoder. The bits in Sℓ are generated
by a random mapping ΦSℓ , which yields the following distribution:
uiℓ =

0 with probability P
Ui
ℓ
|U1:i−1
ℓ
,X
[N ]
1:ℓ−1
(0|u1:i−1ℓ , x[N ]1:ℓ−1),
1 with probability P
Ui
ℓ
|U1:i−1
ℓ
,X
[N ]
1:ℓ−1
(1|u1:i−1ℓ , x[N ]1:ℓ−1).
(20)
Theorem 3 (Construction of multilevel polar codes [15]): Consider a polar code with the above encoding strategy.
Then, any message rate arbitrarily close to I(Xℓ;Y|X1:ℓ−1) is achievable using SC decoding10 and the expectation
of the decoding error probability over the randomized mappings satisfies EΦSℓ [Pe(φSℓ)] = O(2
−Nβ′ ) for any
β′ < β < 0.5.
Now let us pick a suitable input distribution PX1:r to implement the shaping. As shown in Theorem 1, the
mutual information between the discrete Gaussian lattice distribution DΛ,σs and the output of the AWGN channel
approaches 12 log(1 + SNR) as the flatness factor ǫΛ(σ˜) → 0. Therefore, we use the lattice Gaussian distribution
PX ∼ DΛ,σs as the constellation, which gives us limr→∞ PX1:r = PX ∼ DΛ,σs . By [15, Lemma 5], when N →∞,
the mutual information I(Xr ;Y|X1:r−1) at the bottom level goes to 0 if r = O(log logN), and using the first r
levels would involve a capacity loss
∑
ℓ>r I(Xℓ;Y|X1:ℓ−1) ≤ O( 1N ).
From the chain rule of mutual information,
I(X1:r;Y) =
r∑
ℓ=1
I(Xℓ;Y|X1:ℓ−1),
we have r binary-input channels and the ℓ-th channel according to I(Xℓ;Y|X1:ℓ−1) is generally asymmetric with
the input distribution PXℓ|X1:ℓ−1 (1 ≤ ℓ ≤ r). Then we can construct the polar code for the asymmetric channel
at each level according to Lemma 8. As a result, the ℓ-th symmetrized channel is equivalent to the MMSE-scaled
Λℓ−1/Λℓ channel in the sense of channel polarization. (See [15] for more details.)
10It is possible to derandomize the mapping ΦSℓ for the purpose of achieving capacity alone. However, it is tricky to handle the random
mapping in order to achieve the secrecy capacity: it requires either to share a secret random mapping or to use the Markov block coding
technique (see Sect. V-D).
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Therefore, when power constraint is taken into consideration, the multilevel polar codes before shaping are
constructed according to the symmetric channel V (Λℓ−1/Λℓ, σ˜2b ) and W (Λℓ−1/Λℓ, σ˜
2
e), where σ˜
2
b =
(
σsσb√
σ2s+σ
2
b
)2
and σ˜2e =
(
σsσe√
σ2s+σ
2
e
)2
are the MMSE-scaled noise variance of the main channel and of the wiretapper’s channel,
respectively. This is similar to the mod-Λs GWC scenario mentioned in the previous section. The difference is that
σ2b and σ
2
e are replaced by σ˜
2
b and σ˜
2
e accorrdingly. As a result, we can still obtain an AWGN-good lattice Λb and
a secrecy-good lattice Λe by treating V (Λℓ−1/Λℓ, σ˜2b ) and W (Λℓ−1/Λℓ, σ˜
2
e) as the main channel and wiretapper’s
channel at each level.
B. Three-dimensional partition
When lattice Gaussian shaping is performed over the AWGN-good lattice Λb and the secrecy-good lattice Λe
simultaneously, we have a new shaping induced partition. The polar coding scheme for the mod-Λs wiretap
channel given in Sect. IV needs to be modified. Now we consider the partition of the index set [N ] with shaping
involved. According to the analysis of asymmetric polar codes, we have to eliminate those indices with small
Z(Uiℓ|U1:i−1ℓ ,X[N ]1:l−1) from the information set of the symmetric channels. Therefore, Alice cannot send message on
those subchannels with Z(Uiℓ|U1:i−1ℓ ,X[N ]1:ℓ−1) < 1− 2−N
β
. Note that this part is the same for V˜ℓ and W˜ℓ, because
it only depends on the shaping distribution. At each level, the index set which is used for shaping is given as
Sℓ ,
{
i ∈ [N ] : Z(Uiℓ|U1:i−1ℓ ,X[N ]1:ℓ−1) < 1− 2−N
β
}
,
and the index set which is not for shaping is denoted by Scℓ . Recall that for the index set [N ], we already have
two partition criteria, i.e, reliability-good and information-bad (see (4)). We rewrite the reliability-good index set
Gℓ and information-poor index set Nℓ at level ℓ as
Gℓ ,
{
i ∈ [N ] : Z(Uiℓ|U1:i−1ℓ ,X[N ]1:ℓ−1,Y[N ]) ≤ 2−N
β
}
,
Nℓ ,
{
i ∈ [N ] : Z(Uiℓ|U1:i−1ℓ ,X[N ]1:ℓ−1,Z[N ]) ≥ 1− 2−N
β
}
.
(21)
Note that Gℓ and Nℓ are defined by the asymmetric Bhattacharyya parameters. Nevertheless, by Lemma 9 and the
channel equivalence, we have Gℓ = G(V˜ℓ) and Nℓ = N (W˜ℓ) as defined in (4), where V˜ℓ and W˜ℓ are the respective
symmetric channels or the MMSE-scaled Λℓ−1/Λℓ channels for Bob and Eve at level ℓ. The four sets Aℓ, Bℓ, Cℓ,
and Dℓ are defined in the same fashion as (5), with Gℓ and Nℓ replacing G(V˜ℓ) and N (W˜ℓ), respectively. Now the
whole index set [N ] is divided like a cube in three directions, which is shown in Fig. 5.
Clearly, we have eight blocks:
ASℓ = Aℓ ∩ Sℓ, AS
c
ℓ = Aℓ ∩ Scℓ
BSℓ = Bℓ ∩ Sℓ, BS
c
ℓ = Bℓ ∩ Scℓ
CSℓ = Cℓ ∩ Sℓ, CS
c
ℓ = Cℓ ∩ Scℓ
DSℓ = Dℓ ∩ Sℓ, DS
c
ℓ = Dℓ ∩ Scℓ
(22)
By Lemma 7, we observe that ASℓ = CSℓ = ∅, AS
c
ℓ = Aℓ, and CS
c
ℓ = Cℓ. The shaping set Sℓ is divided into two
sets BSℓ and DSℓ . The bits in Sℓ are determined by the bits in Scℓ according to the mapping. Similarly, Scℓ is divided
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not poor for Eve information poor  for Eve
Good for Bob
Bad for Bob
Fig. 5. Partitions of the index set [N ] with shaping.
into the four sets AScℓ = Aℓ, BS
c
ℓ , CS
c
ℓ = Cℓ, and DS
c
ℓ . Note that for wiretap coding, the frozen set becomes CS
c
ℓ ,
which is slightly different from the frozen set for channel coding. To satisfy the reliability condition, the frozen set
CScℓ and the problematic set DS
c
ℓ cannot be set uniformly random any more. Recall that only the independent frozen
set Fℓ at each level, which is defined as {i ∈ [N ] : Z(Uiℓ|U1:i−1ℓ ,Y[N ],X[N ]1:ℓ−1) ≥ 1− 2−N
β}, can be set uniformly
random (which are already shared between Alice and Bob), and the bits in the unpolarized frozen set F¯ℓ, defined
as {i ∈ [N ] : 2−Nβ < Z(Uiℓ|U1:i−1ℓ ,Y[N ],X[N ]1:ℓ−1) < 1− 2−N
β}, should be determined according to the mapping.
Moreover, we can observe that Fℓ ⊂ CScℓ and DS
c
ℓ ⊂ Dℓ ⊂ F¯ℓ. Here we make the bits in Fℓ uniformly random
and the bits in CScℓ \ Fℓ and DS
c
ℓ determined by the mapping. Therefore, from now on, we adjust the definition of
the shaping bits as:
Sℓ ,
{
i ∈ [N ] : Z(Uiℓ|U1:i−1ℓ ,X[N ]1:ℓ−1) < 1− 2−N
β
or 2−N
β
< Z(Uiℓ|U1:i−1ℓ ,Y[N ],X[N ]1:ℓ−1) < 1− 2−N
β
}
, (23)
which is essentially equivalent to the definition of the shaping set given in Theorem 3.
To sum up, at level ℓ, we assign the sets AScℓ , BS
c
ℓ , and Fℓ with message bits Mℓ, uniformly random bits
Rℓ, and uniform frozen bits Fℓ, respectively. The rest bits Sℓ (in Sℓ) will be fed with random bits according to
P
Ui
ℓ
|U1:i−1
ℓ
,X
[N ]
1:l−1
. Clearly, this shaping operation will make the input distribution arbitrarily close to PXℓ|X1:ℓ−1 , for
β fixed and N tending to infinity. In this case, we can obtain the equality between the Bhattacharyya parameter
of asymmetric setting and symmetric setting (see Lemma 9). This provides us a convenient way to prove the
strong secrecy of the wiretap coding scheme with shaping because we have already proved the strong secrecy of
a symmetric wiretap coding scheme using the Bhattacharyya parameter of the symmetric setting. A detailed proof
will be presented in the following subsection. Before this, we show that the shaping will not change the message
rate.
Lemma 10: For the symmetrized main channel V˜ℓ and wiretapper’s channel W˜ℓ, consider the reliability-good
indices set Gℓ and information-bad indices set Nℓ defined as in (21). By eliminating the shaping set Sℓ from the
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original message set defined in (5), we get the new message set AScℓ = Gℓ ∩ Nℓ ∩ Scℓ . The proportion of |AS
c
ℓ |
equals to that of |Aℓ|, and the message rate after shaping can still be arbitrarily close to 12 log σ˜
2
e
σ˜2
b
.
Proof. By Theorem 2, when shaping is not involved, the message rate can be made arbitrarily close to 12 log
σ˜2e
σ˜2
b
.
By the new definition (23) of Sℓ, we still have ASℓ = ∅, which means the shaping operation will not affect the
message rate.
C. Strong secrecy
In this subsection, we prove that strong secrecy can still be achieved when shaping is involved. To this end, we
introduce a new induced channel from Eve’s perspective and prove that the information leakage over this channel
vanishes at each level. Then, strong secrecy is proved by using the chain rule of mutual information as in (15).
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Fig. 6. Block diagram of the shaping-induced channel QN (W,S).
In [8], an induced channel is defined in order to prove strong secrecy. Here we call it the randomness-induced
channel because it is induced by feeding the subchannels in the sets Bℓ and Dℓ with uniformly random bits.
However, when shaping is involved, the set Bℓ and Dℓ are no longer fed with uniformly random bits. In fact, some
subchannels (covered by the shaping mapping) should be fed with bits according to a random mapping. We define
the channel induced by the shaping bits as the shaping-induced channel.
Definition 5 (Shaping-induced channel): The shaping-induced channel QN (W,S) is defined in terms of N uses
of an asymmetric channel W , and a shaping subset S of [N ] of size |S|. The input alphabet of QN (W,S) is
{0, 1}N−|S| and the bits in S are determined by the input bits according to a random shaping ΦS . A block diagram
of the shaping induced channel is shown in Fig. 6.
Based on the shaping-induced channel, we define a new induced channel, which is caused by feeding a part of
the input bits of the shaping-induced channel with uniformly random bits.
Definition 6 (New induced channel): Based on a shaping induced channel QN (W,S), the new induced channel
QN (W,S,R) is specified in terms of a randomness subset R of size |R|. The randomness is introduced into the
input set of the shaping-induced channel. The input alphabet of QN (W,S,R) is {0, 1}N−|S|−|R| and the bits in
R are uniformly and independently random. A block diagram of the new induced channel is shown in Fig. 7.
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Fig. 7. Block diagram of the new induced channel QN (W,S,R).
The new induced channel is a combination of the shaping-induced channel and randomness-induced channel.
This is different from the definition given in [8] because the bits in S are neither independent to the message bits
nor uniformly distributed. As long as the input bits of the new induced channel are uniform and the shaping bits are
chosen according to the random mapping, the new induced channel can still generate 2N possible realizations
x
[N ]
ℓ of X
[N ]
ℓ as N goes to infinity, and those x
[N ]
ℓ can be viewed as the output of N i.i.d binary sources
with input distribution PXℓ|X1:ℓ−1 . These are exactly the conditions required by Lemma 9. Specifically, we have
Z
(
Uiℓ|U1:i−1ℓ ,X[N ]1:ℓ−1,Z[N ]
)
= Z˜
(
U˜iℓ|U˜1:i−1ℓ ,X[N ]1:ℓ−1,X[N ]ℓ ⊕ X˜[N ]ℓ ,Z[N ]
)
. In simple words, this equation holds when
x
[N ]
ℓ and x
[N ]
ℓ ⊕x˜[N ]ℓ are all selected from {0, 1}N according to their respective distributions. Then we can exploit the
relation between the asymmetric channel and the corresponding symmetric channel to bound the mutual information
of the asymmetric channel. Therefore, we have to stick to the input distribution (uniform) of our new induced
channel and also the distribution of the random mapping. This is similar to the setting of the randomness induced
channel in [8], where the input distribution and the randomness distribution are both set to be uniform. In [8], the
randomness-induced channel is further proved to be symmetric; then any other input distribution can also achieve
strong secrecy and the symmetry finally results in semantic security. In this work, however, we do not have a proof
of the symmetry of the new induced channel. For this reason, we assume for now that the message bits are uniform
distributed. To prove semantic security, we will show that the information leakage of the symmetrized version of
the new induced channel is vanishing in Sect. V-E.
Lemma 11: Let Mℓ be the uniformly distributed message bits and Fℓ be the independent frozen bits at the input
of the channel at the ℓ-th level. When shaping bits Sℓ are selected according to the random mapping ΦSℓ
11 and
N is sufficiently large, the mutual information can be upper-bounded as
I
(
MℓFℓ;Z
[N ],X
[N ]
1:ℓ−1
)
≤ O(N22−Nβ
′
).
11We will further show that the number of shaping bits Sℓ covered by random mapping can be significantly reduced in Sect. V-E. Then, to
achieve reliability, Sℓ can be shared between Alice and Bob, or we can use the Markov block coding technique to hide Sℓ with negligible rate
loss.
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Proof. We firstly assume that Uiℓ is selected according to the distribution PUi
ℓ
|U1:i−1
ℓ
,X
[N ]
1:ℓ−1
for all i ∈ [N ], i.e.,
uiℓ =

0 with probability P
Ui
ℓ
|U1:i−1
ℓ
,X
[N ]
1:ℓ−1
(0|u1:i−1ℓ , x[N ]1:ℓ−1),
1 with probability P
Ui
ℓ
|U1:i−1
ℓ
,X
[N ]
1:ℓ−1
(1|u1:i−1ℓ , x[N ]1:ℓ−1).
(24)
for all i ∈ [N ]. In this case, the input distribution PXℓ|X1:ℓ−1 at each level is exactly the optimal input distribution
obtained from the lattice Gaussian distribution. The mutual information between MℓFℓ and
(
Z[N ],X
[N ]
1:ℓ−1
)
in this
case is denoted by IP
(
MℓFℓ;Z
[N ],X
[N ]
1:ℓ−1
)
.
For the shaping induced channel QN (Wℓ,Sℓ,Rℓ) (Rℓ is BScℓ according to the above analysis), we write the
indices of the input bits (Sℓ ∪Rℓ)c = [N ] \ (Sℓ ∪Rℓ) as {i1, i2, ..., iN−sℓ−rℓ}, where |R| = rℓ and |Sℓ| = sℓ, and
assume that i1 < i2 < · · · < iN−sℓ−rℓ . We have
IP
(
MℓFℓ;Z
[N ],X
[N ]
1:ℓ−1
)
= IP
(
U
(Sℓ∪Rℓ)c
ℓ ;Z
[N ],X
[N ]
1:ℓ−1
)
= IP
(
U
i1
ℓ ,U
i2
ℓ , ...,U
iN−rℓ−sℓ
ℓ ;Z
[N ],X
[N ]
1:ℓ−1
)
=
N−rℓ−sℓ∑
j=1
IP
(
U
ij
ℓ ;Z
[N ],X
[N ]
1:ℓ−1|Ui1ℓ ,Ui2ℓ , ...,Uij−1ℓ
)
=
N−rℓ−sℓ∑
j=1
IP
(
U
ij
ℓ ;Z
[N ],X
[N ]
1:ℓ−1,U
i1
ℓ ,U
i2
ℓ , ...,U
ij−1
ℓ
)
(a)
≤
N−rℓ−sℓ∑
j=1
IP
(
U
ij
ℓ ;Z
[N ],X
[N ]
1:ℓ−1,U
1
ℓ ,U
2
ℓ , ...,U
ij−1
ℓ
)
,
where (a) holds because adding more variables will not decrease the mutual information.
Then the above mutual information can be bounded by the mutual information of the symmetric channel plus
an infinitesimal term as follows:
N−rℓ−sℓ∑
j=1
IP
(
U
ij
ℓ ;Z
[N ],X
[N ]
1:ℓ−1,U
1:ij−1
ℓ
)
(a)
≤
N−rℓ−sℓ∑
j=1
I
(
U˜
ij
ℓ ;Z
[N ],X
[N ]
1:ℓ−1, X˜
[N ]
ℓ ⊕ X[N ]ℓ , U˜1:ij−1ℓ
)
+H
(
U˜
ij
ℓ |Z[N ],X[N ]1:ℓ−1, X˜[N ]ℓ ⊕ X[N ]ℓ , U˜1:ij−1ℓ
)
−
N−rℓ−sℓ∑
j=1
H
(
U
ij
ℓ |Z[N ],X[N ]1:ℓ−1,U1:ij−1ℓ
)
(b)
≤
N−rℓ−sℓ∑
j=1
I
(
U˜
ij
ℓ ;Z
[N ],X
[N ]
1:ℓ−1, X˜
[N ]
ℓ ⊕X [N ]ℓ , U˜1:ij−1ℓ
)
+
N−rℓ−sℓ∑
j=1
Z
(
U
ij
ℓ |Z[N ],X[N ]1:ℓ−1,U1:ij−1ℓ
)
−
(
Z(U
ij
ℓ |Z[N ],X[N ]1:ℓ−1,U1:ij−1ℓ )
)2
(c)
≤
N−rℓ−sℓ∑
j=1
I
(
U˜
ij
ℓ ;Z
[N ],X
[N ]
1:ℓ−1, X˜
[N ]
ℓ ⊕ X[N ]ℓ , U˜1:ij−1ℓ
)
+N2−N
β
(d)
≤ N2−Nβ
′
+N2−N
β
≤ 2N2−Nβ
′
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for 0 < β′ < β < 0.5. Inequalities (a)-(d) follow from
(a) uniformly distributed U˜
ij
ℓ ,
(b) [40, Proposition 2] which gives H(X|Y)−H(X|Y,Z) ≤ Z(X|Y)− (Z(X|Y,Z)2) and Lemma 9,
(c) our coding scheme guaranteeing that Z
(
U
ij
ℓ |Z[N ],X[N ]1:ℓ−1,U1:ij−1ℓ
)
is greater than 1−2−Nβ for the frozen
bits and information bits,
(d) Lemma 2.
For wiretap coding, the message Mℓ, frozen bits Fℓ and random bits Rℓ are all uniformly random, and the
shaping bits Sℓ are determined by S
c
ℓ according to ΦSℓ . Let QU[N ]
ℓ
,X
[N ]
1:ℓ−1,Z
[N ] denote the joint distribution of
(U
[N ]
ℓ ,X
[N ]
1:ℓ−1,Z
[N ]) resulted from uniformly distributed MℓFℓRℓ and Sℓ according to ΦSℓ . By the proofs of [15,
Th. 5] and [15, Th. 6], the total variation distance can be bounded as∥∥∥Q
U
[N ]
ℓ
,X
[N ]
1:ℓ−1
,Z[N ]
− P
U
[N ]
ℓ
,X
[N ]
1:ℓ−1
,Z[N ]
∥∥∥ ≤ N2−Nβ′ (25)
for sufficiently large N .
By [41, Proposition 5], the mutual information I(MℓFℓ;Z
[N ],X
[N ]
1:ℓ−1) due to QU[N ]
ℓ
,X
[N ]
1:ℓ−1,Z
[N ] satisfies∣∣∣I(MℓFℓ;Z[N ],X[N ]1:ℓ−1)− IP (MℓFℓ;Z[N ],X[N ]1:ℓ−1)∣∣∣ ≤ 7N2−Nβ′ log 2N + h2(N2−Nβ′)+ h2(4N2−Nβ′)
= O
(
N22−N
β′
)
,
where h2(·) denotes the binary entropy function.
Finally, strong secrecy (for uniform message bits) can be proved in the same fashion as shown in (15) as:
I
(
MF;Z[N ]
)
≤
r∑
ℓ=1
I
(
MℓFℓ;Z
[N ],X
[N ]
1:ℓ−1
)
= O
(
rN22−N
β′
)
. (26)
Therefore we conclude that the whole shaping scheme is secure in the sense that the mutual information leakage
between M and Z[N ] vanishes with the block length N .
D. Reliability
The reliability analysis in Sect. IV-B holds for the wiretap coding without shaping. When shaping is involved,
the problematic set Dℓ at each level is included in the shaping set Sℓ and hence determined by the random mapping
ΦSℓ . In this subsection, we propose two decoders to achieve reliability for the shaping case. The first one requires
a private link between Alice and Bob to share a vanishing fraction of the random mapping ΦSℓ and the second one
uses the Markov block coding technique [9] without sharing the random mapping.
Decoder 1: If ΦSℓ is secretly shared between Alice and Bob (we will show in a moment that only a vanishing
fraction of ΦSℓ needs to be shared), the bits in Dℓ can be recovered by Bob simply by the shared mapping but
not requiring the Markov block coding technique. By Theorem 3, the reliability at each level can be guaranteed
by uniformly distributed independent frozen bits and a random mapping ΦSℓ according to PUi
ℓ
|U1:i−1
ℓ
,X
[N ]
1:ℓ−1
at each
level. The decoding rule is given as follows.
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• Decoding: The decoder receives y[N ] and estimates û[N ]ℓ based on the previously recovered x
[N ]
1:ℓ−1 according
to the rule
ûiℓ =

uiℓ, if i ∈ Fℓ
φi(û
1:i−1
ℓ , x
[N ]
1:ℓ−1), if i ∈ Sℓ
argmax
u
P
Ui
ℓ
|U1:i−1
ℓ
,X
[N ]
1:ℓ−1,Y
[N ](u|û1:i−1ℓ , x[N ]1:ℓ−1, y[N ]), if i ∈ Iℓ
.
Note that probability P
Ui
ℓ
|U1:i−1
ℓ
,X
[N ]
1:ℓ−1,Y
[N ](u|û1:i−1ℓ , x[N ]1:ℓ−1, y[N ]) can be calculated by the SC decoding algorithm
efficiently, treating Y and X1:ℓ−1 (already decoded by the SC decoder at previous levels) as the outputs of the
asymmetric channel. As a result, the expectation of the decoding error probability over the randomized mappings
satisfies EΦSℓ [Pe(φSℓ)] = O(2
−Nβ′ ) for any β′ < β < 0.5.
Consequently, by the multilevel decoding and union bound, the expectation of the block error probability of our
wiretap coding scheme is vanishing as N →∞. However, this result is based on the assumption that the mapping
ΦSℓ is only shared between Alice and Bob. To share this mapping, we can let Alice and Bob have access to the
same source of randomness, which may be achieved by a private link between Alice and Bob. Fortunately, the rate
of this private link can be made vanishing since the proportion of the shaping bits covered by the mapping ΦSℓ
can be significantly reduced.
Recall that the shaping set Sℓ is defined by
Sℓ ,
{
i ∈ [N ] : Z(Uiℓ|U1:i−1ℓ ,X[N ]1:ℓ−1) < 1− 2−N
β
or 2−N
β
< Z(Uiℓ|U1:i−1ℓ ,Y[N ],X[N ]1:ℓ−1) < 1− 2−N
β
}
. (27)
It has been shown in [37, Th. 2] and [42, Th. 15] that the shaping bits in the subset {i ∈ [N ] : Z(Uiℓ|U1:i−1ℓ ,X[N ]1:ℓ−1) ≤
2−N
β} can be recovered according to the rule
uiℓ = argmax
u
P
Ui
ℓ
|U1:i−1
ℓ
,X1:N1:ℓ−1
(u|u1:i−1ℓ , x1:N1:ℓ−1) if Z(Uiℓ|U1:i−1ℓ ,X[N ]1:ℓ−1) ≤ 2−N
β
,
instead of mapping. This modification has negligible impact on strong secrecy. Let us explain it briefly. For
the shaping bits in Sℓ with Z(Uiℓ|U1:i−1ℓ ,X[N ]1:ℓ−1) ≤ 2−N
β
, we also have H(Uiℓ|U1:i−1ℓ ,X[N ]1:ℓ−1) ≤ 2−N
β
. This
means that Uiℓ in Sℓ is almost determined by U1:i−1ℓ and X[N ]1:ℓ−1 when N is sufficiently large. The probability
P
Ui
ℓ
|U1:i−1
ℓ
,X1:N1:ℓ−1
(u|u1:i−1ℓ , x1:N1:ℓ−1) for those bits can be arbitrarily close to either 0 or 1. Therefore, replacing the
random rounding rule with the MAP decision rule for those bits will yield another vanishing term N2−N
β′
on
the right hand side of the upper bound of the total variation distance as shown in (25), which results in negligible
difference on the information leakage when N grows large. Moreover, since Z(Uiℓ|U1:i−1ℓ ,X[N ]1:ℓ−1) ≤ 2−N
β
for
theses shaping bits, using the MAP decision rule will also yield an additional vanishing term N2−N
β′
on the upper
bound of the decoding error probability for Bob. As a result, the deterministic mapping has only to cover the
unpolarized set
dSℓ =
{
i ∈ [N ] : 2−Nβ < Z(Uiℓ|U1:i−1ℓ ,X1:N1:ℓ−1) < 1− 2−N
β
or
2−N
β
< Z(Uiℓ|U1:i−1ℓ ,Y1:N ,X1:N1:ℓ−1) < 1− 2−N
β
}
,
whose proportion
|dSℓ|
N → 0 as N →∞.
June 13, 2018 DRAFT
30
Remark 7. By the channel equivalence, when ΦSℓ is shared to Bob, the decoding of Λb is equivalent to the MMSE
lattice decoding proposed in [6] for random lattice codes. When instantiated with a polar lattice, we use multistage
lattice decoding. More explicitly, by [15, Lemma 7], the SC decoding of the asymmetric channel can be converted
to the SC decoding of its symmetrized channel, which is equivalent to the MMSE-scaled partition channel in the
lattice Gaussian shaping case [15, Lemma 9].
Decoder 2: Alternatively, one can also use the block Markov coding technique [9] to achieve reliability without
sharing ΦSℓ . As shown in Fig. 8, the message at ℓ-th level is divided into kℓ blocks. Denote by ∆Sℓ the bits in
unpolarized set dSℓ. The shaping bits Sℓ for each block is further divided into unpolarized bits ∆Sℓ and polarized
shaping bits Sℓ \ ∆Sℓ. As mentioned above, only ∆Sℓ needs to be covered by mapping and its proportion is
vanishing. We can sacrifice some message bits to convey ∆Sℓ for the next block without involving significant rate
loss. These wasted message bits are denoted by Eℓ. For encoding, we start with the last block (Block kℓ). Given Fℓ,
Mℓ (no Eℓ for the last block) and Rℓ, we can obtain ∆Sℓ according to ΦSℓ . Then we copy ∆Sℓ of the last block
to the bits Eℓ of its previous block and do encoding to get the ∆Sℓ of block kℓ− 1. This process ends until we get
the ∆Sℓ of the first block. This scheme is similar to the one we discussed in Sect. IV-B. To achieve reliability, we
need a secure code with vanishing rate to convey the bits ∆Sℓ of the first block to Bob. See [43] for an example of
such codes. To guarantee an insignificant rate loss, kℓ is required to be sufficiently large. We may set kℓ = O(N
α)
for some α > 0.
…
Block 1 Block 2 Block 
…
frozen bits
message bits
random bits
random bits
shaping bits
(polarized)
unpolarized bits
Fig. 8. Markov block coding scheme without sharing the secret mapping.
Now we present the main theorem of the paper.
Theorem 4 (Achieving secrecy capacity of the GWC): Consider a multilevel lattice code constructed from polar
codes based on asymmetric channels and lattice Gaussian shaping DΛ,σs . Given σ
2
e > σ
2
b , let ǫΛ(σ˜e) be negligible
and set the number of levels r = O(log logN) for N → ∞. Then all strong secrecy rates R satisfying R <
1
2 log
(
1+SNRb
1+SNRe
)
are achievable for the Gaussian wiretap channel, where SNRb and SNRe denote the SNR of the
main channel and wiretapper’s channel, respectively.
Proof. The reliability condition and the strong secrecy condition are satisfied by Theorem 3 and Lemma 11,
June 13, 2018 DRAFT
31
respectively. It remains to illustrate that the secrecy rate approaches the secrecy capacity. For some ǫ′ → 0, we have
lim
N→∞
R =
r∑
ℓ=1
lim
N→∞
|AScℓ |
N
=
r∑
ℓ=1
I(Xℓ;Y|X1, · · ·,Xℓ−1)− I(Xℓ;Z|X1, · · ·,Xℓ−1)
(a)
=
1
2
log
(
σ˜2e
σ˜2b
)
− ǫ′
(b)
≥ 1
2
log
(
1 + SNRb
1 + SNRe
)
− ǫ′,
(28)
where (a) is due to Lemma 10, and (b) is because the signal power Ps ≤ σ2s [30, Lemma 1]12, respectively.
E. Semantic security
In this subsection, we extend strong secrecy of the constructed polar lattices to semantic security, namely the
resulted strong secrecy does not rely on the distribution of the message. We take the level-1 wiretapper’s channel
W1 as an example. Our goal is to show that the maximum mutual information between M1F1 and Z
[N ] is vanishing
for any input distribution as N → ∞. Unlike the symmetric randomness induced channel introduced in [8], the
new induced channel is generally asymmetric with transition probability
Q(z|v) = 1
2r1
∑
ΦS1
P (ΦS1)
∑
e∈{0,1}r1
WN1 (z|(v, e,ΦS1(v, e))GN ),
where ΦS1(v, e) represents the shaping bits determined by v (the frozen bits and message bits together) and e (the
random bits) according to the random mapping ΦS1 . It is difficult to find the optimal input distribution to maximize
the mutual information for the new induced channel.
To prove the semantic security, we investigate the relationship between the i-th subchannel of W1,N and the i-th
subchannel of its symmetrized version W˜1,N , which are denoted by W
(i,N)
1 and W˜
(i,N)
1 , respectively. According to
Lemma 8, the asymmetric wiretap channelW1 : X1 → Z is symmetrized to channel W˜1 : X˜1 → (Z, X˜1⊕X1). After
the N -by-N polarization transform, we obtain W
(i,N)
1 : U
i
1 → (U1:i−11 ,Z[N ]) and W˜ (i,N)1 : U˜i1 → (U˜1:i−11 , X˜[N ]1 ⊕
X
[N ]
1 ,Z
[N ]). The next lemma shows that if we symmetrize W
(i,N)
1 directly, i.e., construct a symmetric channel
˜
W
(i,N)
1 : U˜
i
1 → (U1:i−11 ,Z[N ], U˜i1 ⊕ Ui1) in the sense of Lemma 8, ˜W (i,N)1 is degraded with respect to W˜ (i,N)1 .
Lemma 12: The symmetrized channel
˜
W
(i,N)
1 derived directly from W
(i,N)
1 is degraded with respect to the i-th
subchannel W˜
(i,N)
1 of W˜1.
Proof. According to the proof of [38, Theorem 2], we have the relationship
W˜
(i,N)
1 (u˜
1:i−1
1 , x˜
[N ]
1 ⊕ x[N ]1 , z[N ]|u˜i1) = 2−N+1PU1:i1 ,Z[N ](u1:i1 , z[N ]).
Letting x˜
[N ]
1 ⊕ x[N ]1 = 0[N ], the equation becomes W˜ (i,N)1 (u1:i−11 , 0[N ], z[N ]|ui1) = 2−N+1PU1:i1 ,Z[N ](u1:i1 , z[N ]),
which has already been addressed in [38]. However, for a fixed x
[N ]
1 and u˜
i
1 = u
i
1, since GN is full rank, there are
2N−1 choices of x˜[N ]1 remaining, which means that there exists 2
N−1 outputs symbols of W˜ (i,N)1 having the same
12Of course, R cannot exceed the secrecy capacity, so this inequality implies that Ps → σ2s .
June 13, 2018 DRAFT
32
transition probability 2−N+1PU1:i1 ,Z[N ](u
1:i
1 , z
[N ]). Suppose a middle channel which maps all these output symbols
to one single symbol, which is with transition probability PU1:i1 ,Z[N ](u
1:i
1 , z
[N ]). The same operation can be done
for u˜i1 = u
i
1⊕ 1, making another symbol with transition probability PU1:i1 ,Z[N ](u1:i1 , z[N ]) corresponding to the input
ui1 ⊕ 1. This is a channel degradation process, and the degraded channel is symmetric.
Then we show that the symmetrized channel
˜
W
(i,N)
1 is equivalent to the degraded channel mentioned above. By
Lemma 8, the channel transition probability of
˜
W
(i,N)
1 is
˜
W
(i,N)
1 (u
1:i−1
1 , u˜
i
1 ⊕ ui1, z[N ]|u˜i1) = PU1:i1 ,Z[N ](u1:i1 , z[N ]),
which is equal to the transition probability of the degraded channel discussed in the previous paragraph. Therefore,
˜
W
(i,N)
1 is degraded with respect to W˜
(i,N)
1 .
Remark 8. In fact, a stronger relationship that
˜
W
(i,N)
1 is equivalent to W˜
(i,N)
1 can be proved. This is because
that the output symbols combined in the channel degradation process have the same LR. An evidence of this result
can be found in [38, Equation (36)], where Z˜(W˜
(i,N)
1 ) = Z(U
i
1|U1:i−11 ,Z[N ]) = Z˜(˜W (i,N)1 ). Nevertheless, the
degradation relationship is sufficient for this work. Notice that Lemma 12 can be generalized to high level ℓ, with
outputs Z[N ] replaced by (Z[N ],X
[N ]
1:ℓ−1).
Illuminated by Lemma 12, we can also symmetrize the new induced channel at level ℓ and show that it is
degraded with respect to the randomness-induced channel constructed from W˜ℓ. For simplicity, letting ℓ = 1, the
new induced channel at level 1 is QN (W1,S1,R1) : U(S1∪R1)
c
1 → Z[N ], which is symmetrized to Q˜N (W1,S1,R1) :
U˜
(S1∪R1)c
1 → (Z[N ], U˜(S1∪R1)
c
1 ⊕U(S1∪R1)
c
1 ) in the same fashion as in Lemma 8. Recall that the randomness-induced
channel of W˜1 defined in [8] can be denoted as QN (W˜1,R1 ∪ S1) : U˜(S1∪R1)
c
1 → (Z[N ], X˜[N ]1 ⊕ X[N ]1 ). Note that
for the randomness-induced channel QN(W˜1,R1 ∪ S1), set R1 ∪ S1 is fed with uniformly random bits, which is
different from the shaping-induced channel.
Lemma 13: For an asymmetric channel W1 : X1 → Z and its symmetrized channel W˜1 : X˜1 → (Z, X˜1 ⊕ X1),
the symmetrized version of the new induced channel Q˜N (W1,S1,R1) is degraded with respect to the randomness-
induced channel QN (W˜1,R1 ∪ S1).
Proof. The proof is similar to that of Lemma 12. For a fixed realization x
[N ]
1 and input u˜
(S1∪R1)c
1 , there are
2|S1∪R1| choice of x˜[N ]1 remaining. Since z
[N ] is only dependent on x
[N ]
1 , we can build a middle channel which
merges the 2|S1∪R1| output symbols of QN (W˜1,R1∪S1) to one output symbol of Q˜N (W1,S1,R1), which means
that Q˜N (W1,S1,R1) is degraded with respect to QN(W˜1,R1∪S1). Again, this result can be generalized to higher
levels.
Finally, we are ready to prove the semantic security of our wiretap coding scheme. For brevity, let MℓFℓ and
M˜ℓF˜ℓ denote U
(Sℓ∪Rℓ)c
ℓ and U˜
(Sℓ∪Rℓ)c
ℓ , respectively. Recall that M is divided into M1, ...,Mr at each level. We
express MF and M˜F˜ as the collection of message and frozen bits on all levels of the new induced channel and the
symmetric randomness-induced channel, respectively. We also define M˜F˜⊕MF as the operation M˜ℓF˜ℓ⊕MℓFℓ from
level 1 to level r.
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Theorem 5 (Semantic security): For arbitrarily distributed message M, the information leakage I(M;Z[N ]) of the
proposed wiretap lattice code is upper-bounded as
I
(
M;Z[N ]
)
≤ I
(
M˜F˜;Z[N ], M˜F˜⊕MF
)
≤ rN2−Nβ
′
,
where I
(
M˜F˜;Z[N ], M˜F˜ ⊕ MF
)
is the capacity of the symmetrized channel derived from the non-binary channel
MF→ Z[N ] 13.
Proof. By [8, Proposition 16], the channel capacity of the randomness-induced channel QN(W˜1,S1,R1) is
upper-bounded by N2−N
β′
when partition rule (4) is used. By channel degradation, the channel capacity of
the symmetrized new induced channel Q˜N (W1,S1,R1) can also be upper-bounded by N2−Nβ
′
. Since this
result can be generalized to higher level ℓ (ℓ ≥ 1), we obtain C(Q˜N (Wℓ,Sℓ,Rℓ)) ≤ N2−Nβ
′
, which means
I
(
M˜ℓF˜ℓ;Z
[N ],X
[N ]
1:ℓ−1, M˜ℓF˜ℓ ⊕MℓFℓ
)
≤ N2−Nβ′ . Similarly to (15), we have
I
(
M˜F˜;Z[N ], M˜F˜⊕MF
)
=
r∑
ℓ=1
I
(
M˜ℓF˜ℓ;Z
[N ], M˜F˜⊕MF|M˜1:ℓ−1F˜1:ℓ−1
)
=
r∑
ℓ=1
H
(
M˜ℓF˜ℓ|M˜1:ℓ−1F˜1:ℓ−1
)
−H
(
M˜ℓF˜ℓ|Z[N ], M˜F˜⊕MF, M˜1:ℓ−1F˜1:ℓ−1
)
≤
r∑
ℓ=1
H
(
M˜ℓF˜ℓ
)
−H
(
M˜ℓF˜ℓ|Z[N ], M˜F˜⊕MF, M˜1:ℓ−1F˜1:ℓ−1
)
=
r∑
ℓ=1
I
(
M˜ℓF˜ℓ;Z
[N ], M˜F˜⊕MF, M˜1:ℓ−1F˜1:ℓ−1
)
(a)
=
r∑
ℓ=1
I
(
M˜ℓF˜ℓ;Z
[N ],M1:ℓ−1F1:ℓ−1, M˜ℓF˜ℓ ⊕MℓFℓ
)
(b)
≤
r∑
ℓ=1
I
(
M˜ℓF˜ℓ;Z
[N ],X
[N ]
1:ℓ−1, M˜ℓF˜ℓ ⊕MℓFℓ
)
≤ rN2−Nβ
′
,
where equality (a) holds because Z[N ] is determined by MFR and M˜ℓF˜ℓ is independent of M˜ℓ+1:rF˜ℓ+1:r ⊕
Mℓ+1:rFℓ+1:r, and inequality (b) holds because adding more variables will not decrease the mutual information.
Therefore, we have
I
(
M;Z[N ]
)
≤ I
(
MF;Z[N ]
)
(a)
≤ H
(
M˜F˜⊕MF
)
−H(MF) + I
(
MF;Z[N ]
)
(b)
= I
(
M˜F˜;Z[N ], M˜F˜⊕MF
)
≤ rN2−Nβ
′
,
where the equality in (a) holds iff MF is also uniform, and (b) is due to the chain rule.
13The symmetrization of a non-binary channel is similar to that of a binary channel as shown in Lemma 8. When X and X˜ are both non-binary,
X⊕ X˜ denotes the result of the exclusive or (xor) operation of the binary expressions of X and X˜.
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VI. DISCUSSION
We would like to elucidate our coding scheme for the Gaussian wiretap channel in terms of the lattice structure. In
Sect. IV, we constructed the AWGN-good lattice Λb and the secrecy-good lattice Λe without considering the power
constraint. When the power constraint is taken into consideration, the lattice Gaussian shaping was implemented in
Sect. V. Λb and Λe were then constructed according to the MMSE-scaled main channel and wiretapper’s channel,
respectively. We note that these two lattices themselves are generated only if the independent frozen bits on all
levels are 0s. Since the independent frozen set of the polar codes at each level is filled with random bits, we actually
obtain a coset Λb + χ of Λb and a coset Λe + χ of Λe simultaneously, where χ is a uniformly distributed shift.
This is because we are unable to fix the independent frozen bits Fℓ in our scheme (due to the lack of the proof that
the shaping-induced channel is symmetric). By using the lattice Gaussian DΛ,σs as our constellation in each lattice
dimension, we would obtain DΛN ,σs without coding. Since Λe + χ ⊂ Λb + χ ⊂ ΛN , we actually implemented the
lattice Gaussian shaping over both Λb + χ and Λe + χ. To summarize, Alice firstly assigns each message m ∈M
to a coset λ˜m ∈ Λb/Λe, then randomly sends a point in the coset Λe + χ + λm (λm is the coset leader of λ˜m)
according to the distribution DΛe+χ+λm,σs . This scheme is consistent with the theoretical model proposed in [6].
On the mod-Λs wiretap channel, semantic security was obtained for free due to the channel symmetry. On
the power-constrained wiretap channel, a symmetrized new induced channel from M˜F˜ to (Z[N ], M˜F˜ ⊕ MF) was
constructed to upper-bound the information leakage. This channel is directly derived from the new induced channel
from MF to Z[N ]. According to Lemma 12, this symmetrized new induced channel is degraded with respect to
the symmetric randomness-induced channel from M˜F˜ to (Z[N ], X˜
[N ]
1:r ⊕ X[N ]1:r ). Moreover, when F˜ is frozen, the
randomness-induced channel from M˜ to (Z[N ], X˜
[N ]
1:r ⊕ X[N ]1:r ) corresponds to the Λb/Λe channel given in Sect. IV
(with MMSE scaling).
APPENDIX A
PROOF OF LEMMA 3
Proof. It is sufficient to show I(MF;Z[N ]) ≤ N ·2−Nβ′ since I(M;Z[N ]) ≤ I(MF;Z[N ]). As has been shown in [8],
the induced channel MF→ Z[N ] is symmetric when B and D are fed with random bits R. For a symmetric channel,
the maximum mutual information is achieved by uniform input distribution. Let U˜A and U˜C denote independent
and uniform versions of M and F and Z˜[N ] be the corresponding channel output. Assuming i1 < i2 < ... < i|A∪C|
are the indices in A ∪ C,
I(MF;Z[N ]) ≤ I(U˜AU˜C ; Z˜[N ])
=
|A∪C|∑
j=1
I(U˜ij ; Z˜[N ]|U˜i1 , ..., U˜ij−1 )
=
|A∪C|∑
j=1
I(U˜ij ; Z˜[N ], U˜i1 , ..., U˜ij−1 )
≤
|A∪C|∑
j=1
I(U˜ij ; Z˜[N ], U˜1:ij−1)
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=
|A∪C|∑
j=1
I(W˜
(ij)
N ) ≤ N · 2−N
β′
.
APPENDIX B
PROOF OF LEMMA 4
Proof. According to the definitions of G(V˜ ) and N (W˜ ) presented in (4),
lim
N→∞
|G(V˜ )|
N
= lim
N→∞
1
N
|{i : Z˜(V˜ (i)N ) ≤ 2−N
β}| = C(V˜ ),
lim
N→∞
|N (W˜ )|
N
= lim
N→∞
1
N
|{i : Z˜(W˜ (i)N ) ≥ 1− 2−N
β}| = 1− C(W˜ ).
Here we define another two sets G¯(V˜ ) and N¯ (W˜ ) as
G¯(V˜ ) = {i : Z˜(V˜ (i)N ) ≥ 1− 2−N
β},
N¯ (W˜ ) = {i : Z˜(W˜ (i)N ) ≤ 2−N
β}.
Similarly, we have limN→∞
|G¯(V˜ )|
N = 1−C(V˜ ) and limN→∞ |N¯ (W˜ )|N = C(W˜ ). Since W˜ is stochastically degraded
with respect to V˜ , G¯(V˜ ) and N¯ (W˜ ) are disjoint with each other [33], then we have
lim
N→∞
|G¯(V˜ ) ∪ N¯ (W˜ )|
N
= 1− C(V˜ ) + C(W˜ ).
By the property of polarization, the proportion of the unpolarized part is vanishing as N goes to infinity, i.e.,
lim
N→∞
|G(V˜ ) ∪ G¯(V˜ )|
N
= 1,
lim
N→∞
|N (W˜ ) ∪ N¯ (W˜ )|
N
= 1,
Finally, we have
lim
N→∞
|G(V˜ ) ∩N (W˜ )|
N
= 1− lim
N→∞
|G¯(V˜ ) ∪ N¯ (W˜ )|
N
= C(V˜ )− C(W˜ ).
APPENDIX C
PROOF OF LEMMA 6
Proof. It is sufficient to demonstrate that channel W (Λℓ−1/Λℓ, σ2e) is degraded with respect to W
′(Xℓ;Z|X1:ℓ−1)
and W ′(Xℓ;Z|X1:ℓ−1) is degraded with respect to W (Λℓ−1/Λℓ, σ2e) as well. To see this, we firstly construct a
middle channel Ŵ from Z ∈ V(Λr) to Z¯ ∈ V(Λℓ). For a specific realization z¯ of Z¯, this Ŵ maps z¯ + [Λℓ/Λr] to
z¯ with probability 1, where [Λℓ/Λr] represents the set of the coset leaders of the partition Λℓ/Λr. Then we obtain
channel W (Λℓ−1/Λℓ, σ2e) by concatenating W
′(Xℓ;Z|X1:ℓ−1) and Ŵ , which means W (Λℓ−1/Λℓ, σ2e) is degraded
to W ′(Xℓ;Z|X1:ℓ−1). Similarly, we can also construct a middle channel Wˇ from Z¯ to Z. For a specific realization
z¯ of Z¯, this Ŵ maps z¯ to z¯ + [Λℓ/Λr] with probability
1
|Λℓ/Λr | , where |Λℓ/Λr| is the order of this partition. This
means that W ′(Xℓ;Z|X1:ℓ−1) is also degraded to W (Λℓ−1/Λℓ, σ2e).
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By channel degradation and [31, Lemma 1], letting channelW andW ′ denoteW (Λℓ−1/Λℓ, σ2e) andW ′(Xℓ;Z|X1:ℓ−1)
for short, we have
Z˜(W
(i)
N ) ≤ Z˜(W ′(i)N ) and Z˜(W (i)N ) ≥ Z˜(W ′(i)N ),
I(W
(i)
N ) ≤ I(W ′(i)N ) and I(W (i)N ) ≥ I(W ′(i)N ),
meaning that Z˜(W
(i)
N ) = Z˜(W
′(i)
N ) and I(W
(i)
N ) = I(W
′(i)
N ).
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